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
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THE ARENA

VOL. XXIV.

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DEMOCRATIC TENDENCIES.

1. IS SOCIALISM AN ELEMENT OF "BRYANISM"?

THAT the political forces under the leadership of Mr. Bryan show a dangerous, or at least an important, tendency toward socialism has been stoutly affirmed by the opposing press and politicians ever since the beginning of the campaign of 1896. However largely this charge may be regarded as the mere recklessness of epithet that characterizes so much of partizan discussion, yet it has gained wide credence. Such a belief is very "catching" because most people think along the line of least resistance, and it is much easier to believe statements that are commonly heard, especially if they are portentous of evil, than to disbelieve or disprove them. But sweeping, indiscriminate assertions of this sort are sometimes found in pretentious articles by conservative writers. One late contributor to a prominent magazine cries alarmingly that "municipal socialism [meaning public ownership of lighting and water works, etc.] will inevitably lead to State and national socialism." Another writer in a periodical of wide repute and the steadiest habits rounds up "the extravagant socialism led by Bryan" as "a body of voters who demand free coinage of silver, government loans on farm produce, government currency to the amount of \$50 per capita, government ownership

of railroads, telegraphs, telephones, gas-works and electric plants, and finally the abolition of the Executive and the Senate and the substitution of an Executive Board chosen by the House of Representatives from its own numbers."

Perhaps the most unfair and misleading fault of these reckless conservatives is their indiscriminate use of the words *radical* and *socialist*. The demands just quoted, and which were cited in proof of the "socialism" of the followers of Bryan, are copied from the Populist national platform of 1892. None of them may fairly be called socialistic, though all of them, excepting that for public ownership of railways and other "natural monopolies," may fairly be called radical, or mere vagaries. The three vagaries of loans on produce, per capita currency, and change in the form of government were copied from the Populist platform of 1892, which is not now the party law. They were adopted in the beginnings of an organization in which the least steady men and the most extravagant notions naturally got the first hearing. They are not now orthodox Populist doctrine; and it is about as fair to represent them as such as to charge that Mr. McKinley is now in favor of free coinage of silver at the old ratio because only a few years before his nomination for the Presidency on a gold-standard platform he publicly demanded the restoration of silver to its former free-coinage status. The proposition to abolish the Executive and the Senate and lodge their functions in the House of Representatives is virtually a proposal to change from the Presidential to the Cabinet system, which is so "English" that it should give no umbrage to present conservative circles. The Democratic party never has advocated the demands quoted, excepting that for free coinage of silver.

The Populists, who favor public ownership of railways, are chiefly confined to the distinctively agricultural States, and are in the main practical farmers. There are very few socialists in these States. In 1892, when the Populists had their most radical platform, the socialist candidate for President received 21,191 votes; and they were all cast in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania,

where Populism has never been able to get a foothold. In 1896 the socialist candidate for President received 36,416 votes. Of these, Connecticut furnished 1,227, Illinois 1,147, Massachusetts 4,548, New Jersey 3,985, and New York 17,677; and all of these States gave overwhelming majorities against Bryan, the Populist candidate. In Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas, all of which went strongly for Bryan, only 172 socialist votes are recorded. Mr. Bryan was nominated by both Populists and Democrats, but their platform contained no socialist declarations. The socialist platform of that year defined socialism—what is now meant by the word—in its demand for “redistribution of the land and of all means of production, transportation, and distribution to the people as a collective body.” It seems to me that it is essential to a rational discussion of present political conditions to keep this distinction in mind. The real socialists were the first in the field this year, with a candidate of their own kind for President; and they fiercely and truthfully denounced Mr. Bryan as an individualist.

State ownership of railways is persistently bundled up with the tenets of socialism by writers against “Bryanism.” It is advocated by Populists who are mainly farmers and owners of their farms, with an anti-socialist end in view. The almost exclusively agricultural States are their strongholds, and these are great distances from the general market to which the vast surplus of their staple products must be transported by the railways. In the sharp competition with like products of the whole world, the cost of this transportation is of vital interest to these Western farmers. Long experience has convinced them, rightly or wrongly, that relief from excessive and inequitable freight charges, to say nothing of the inevitable pernicious influence of private railway corporations in politics, can be secured only through public ownership of the railways. They believe that this is necessary to successful private ownership of their farms, the private ownership of railways being naturally monopolistic and incompatible with the principle or practise of competition. The long-standing examples of pub-

lic ownership of railways in the countries of Continental Europe have not been regarded as socialistic; on the contrary, this policy is generally regarded by its advocates as a necessary **expedient** for insuring the free play of competition in other industries—in short, as a defense instead of an invasion of the competitive system.

These exceptions apply also to the classification of public ownership of municipal lighting-plants, water-works, and street railways as socialism. This policy is quite generally in vogue in countries where the competitive system is most firmly established and has the freest exercise; and it is upheld by conservative statesmen and parliamentary bodies. It appears to be growing in favor among all classes. The English Parliament, for example, has restricted the conditions under which tramway and municipal lighting companies may be chartered with the intention of facilitating the assumption of these functions by the municipalities themselves. It really seems like invoking socialistic bogies for the mere exhilaration of getting scared at them to include the demand of the Bryan platform of 1896 for a graded income tax in the list of frightful examples of Democratic socialism. It is barely worth while to recall that such a tax has been sustained in England by Conservative and Liberal parties since 1842 without being regarded as a socialistic measure or even tainting either of the great parties named with socialism. And the same may be said of the support of the income tax in this country from 1863 to 1872. Mr. Gladstone went so far as to contend that an inheritance or decedent tax is just, on the ground that the right of a person to hold and control property during his lifetime, being a conventional right, does not imply the right to control it after death; but that laws permitting the descent of property to relatives are based upon public expediency, having in view the duty of the citizen to provide for the support of his natural dependents so that they may not become a public charge after his death. Yet Mr. Gladstone was not classed as a socialist or a radical, or as having radical tendencies. If favoring municipal ownership of the so-called natural monop-

lies is to be called socialistic, then Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, notably, and the leading men of all England must be called socialists, and the great municipalities of England are socialistic. And so if a considerable demand for State ownership of railways in this country is socialistic, then the governments of the principal countries of Continental Europe have long been socialistic. If the Democratic demand for a graded income tax makes socialists of Democrats, then Mr. Gladstone and Beaconsfield were and Salisbury is socialistic.

Thus it seems that in view of actual facts and tendencies we are past the stage of calling names and raising scare-heads; and already triumphant socialism may confidently ask, "What are you going to do about it?" Would it not be more hopeful and quieting and altogether saner and safer for our conservatives, who are "in a state of mind" over the fancied approach of the monster, State socialism, to look upon public ownership of the so-called natural monopolies as in effect a flank movement against, rather than a surrender to, their arch-enemy? Is it not a wholesome recognition of the truth, as well as safer, to regard this policy as a necessary *modus vivendi* outside the borders of State socialism? The other alternative seems to lead more likely and more quickly into the dreaded darkest interior. Public ownership of municipal industries is pronounced good where it has been most tried; and, if this good thing is a step within the confines of socialism, why should progress into the full interior be bad? Why indeed would it not be better? Verily, it seems that the nervous conservative is proving too much. Moreover, if public ownership of railways is to be condemned because it is socialistic, what is to become of our post-office and even our public-school system? It is perhaps trite to observe that there is no practicable industrial ground separated by a technical or definite line from the field of general coöperation or socialism. Our Constitutions, national and State, when first put into operation, stepped out of the strict confines of individualism. We have here a question of utility, of expediency, of progress to deal with; and we have had it from the beginning. The question is not whether

we should go outside the limit of strict individualism, but how far and how fast we may safely go.

In 1896 Mr. Bryan carried most of those States known as the "Solid South," and the States west of the Missouri River, with the exception of California and Oregon. From the present outlook his prospect of election this year depends upon the general support of those sections of the country. With the exception of the "silver States"—Colorado, Montana, Nevada, and Utah—which cast only 350,000 of the 6,506,835 votes Mr. Bryan received in 1896, this is a distinctively agricultural region, and in this respect may be differentiated from the States carried by Mr. McKinley. Furthermore, Populism is strongest in the exclusively agricultural States of the Western plains. These States are distinguished by the large percentage of the farmers who own the soil they till. Tradition, history, and reason sustain the theory that this class of people will oppose political radicalism, and in particular State socialism, more generally and obstinately than any other class, excepting the few very rich, when fairly confronted with it. These people will become more conservative as they develop and increase their property interests, relatively at least to the people of any other section or class.

Whatever may be said of Mr. Bryan's audacious opportunism, of the facility with which he catches political sentiment of the hour and turns it to his own account, yet he undoubtedly retains the traditional or instinctive spirit of individualism inherited from a Democratic ancestry; and this quality still inheres in the Democratic party in the main. Having observed Mr. Bryan's political beginnings and evolution, or, as others would put it, his evolutions, from the standpoint of a near neighbor, I have no doubt that he is a positive anti-socialist. And, whatever his political eccentricities, he is not a radical. He has given no sign that he favors public ownership of railways; neither has the Democratic party, and there is no likelihood that it will favor such a policy in its next national platform. Its platform of 1896 contains no socialistic plank. That platform was an outburst of resentment against

the old parties on account of their broken promises and abortive attempts to embody party creeds in legislation. In the twenty years from 1874 to 1894 the people sent decisive Democratic majorities to the lower house of all but two of the ten Congresses covering that period; and they were elected upon specific issues—that of a low tariff being particularly prominent throughout the period. Under our clumsy and contradictory system of “checks and balances,” these Representatives were barred from executing their commissions, fresh from the people, by hostile and previously chosen Executives or Senates. In the one (or perhaps two) of these Congresses in which the Democrats had full sway, with a fellow-partizan in the chair, they illustrated the incompetency if not the break-down of party government by doing nothing but to turn long-suffering popular disappointment into hot resentment.

The hard times were the occasion rather than the cause of this first outbreak of national economic passion of 1896. The basis of the Western farmers’ movement that developed the Populist party was a demand for reform in the administration of railways. By 1896 the net accomplishment of the remedial Interstate Commerce Commission, after a trial of ten years, was the complete demonstration of its imbecility. Cheated anti-monopoly, in the West especially, was looking for a sign and ripe for a Messiah; and it gave ready ear to the siren voice of free silver and its silver-tongued prophet. The demand for free silver was inspired more by a retaliatory spirit than is generally supposed. Here at least was a chance to offset the unjust tariff and transportation tribute so long and so despotically exacted by Eastern capital by paying off Eastern creditors with a cheapened dollar. In the peculiar circumstances, the ethical quality of this expedient was not so bad as its economic quality. It would be, over again, Samson pulling the temple down upon himself as well as upon the Philistines who tortured him. However short-sighted was this free-silver equalizing scheme, it was thoroughly human.

The great body of Mr. Bryan’s supporters—the farmers of the West and South—have no thought of instituting or ad-

vancing socialism. On the contrary, they are in a campaign for overcoming obstacles to competition and individualism in all the ordinary industrial pursuits. Free silver has been virtually dropped—or, more accurately, it has fallen by its own weight. But it may be consistently and plausibly contended that it would be unwise to put "Bryanism" in power next fall because it would be unwise to seem to encourage a revival of the silver question, which will be a nominal though it cannot be made a real issue in the campaign; or because business, so lately recovered from prostration, might shrink in timid fear of the radicalism which has been so much exploited, or of any political change whatever; or because the cause of civil service reform might fare even worse than it has fared under the present, or would fare under a succeeding Republican administration. For "Bryanism," standing as it does for the extension of government business, is singularly if not wantonly inconsistent in refusing by its attitude of devotion to Jacksonian spoils to make rational preparation for increased governmental functions. The fear expressed in some quarters that, in the hands of an administration characterized by Mr. Bryan's facile opportunism, the reforms that he and his party stand for would be set back rather than forwarded, may be worthy of consideration. But with its chief strength in the great agricultural region of the country, where its partizans are prosperously paying off mortgages and adding to their broad acres, is not the seat of "Bryanism" in fact at the antipodes of socialism? Thus far radical, paternalistic, or socialistic laws are only on the statute-books of those States which are relied upon to go most strongly against Bryan.

The controversial arenas of politics and religion are at present strikingly similar. The stiff conservative—who insists that an income tax, or public ownership of a certain class of industries, such as are here specified, is bad because it is socialistic, and will lead to general socialism—is in the same position as the religious preacher who insists that any departure from the letter of Calvin's Institutes or the Westminster Confession is heresy, and if countenanced would lead to the de-

struction of the Christian religion and the Christian Church. But the Protestant Church has preserved its life and insured its growth by the immemorial policy of yielding up dogmas as they have worn out or become untenable and replacing them with timely teaching. The political teacher or the statesman who disregards, or undertakes violently to obstruct, plain political tendencies, because to him they seem radical, is obsolescent. For fear that the Bible would be discredited, conservative ecclesiasticism decreed that the earth must nevertheless be flat after science had demonstrated that it is round; that it should still be fixed in the center of the universe after its heliocentric movement had been proved; that geology was a satanic fraud and evolution a vain device of the wicked. "Conservative" carriers violently obstructed the building of the first railways, and laborers cried out against the introduction of machinery lest they should be left without work. But infant damnation and predestined election of a part and perdition for the rest of mankind are now discredited, or only whispered in the darkest places; the earth is universally round, and that it "do move" there is none to dispute; geology is an exact science, and evolution a universal working hypothesis; railways do the carrying and machinery the manufacturing of the whole civilized world. Yet the priests of the Christian religion proclaim that the Bible is more generally accepted, the Christian Church stronger, and the Christian religion more widespread and useful than ever before; men are employed by thousands in transportation where they were employed by units before the railway came; and labor is far more steadily employed and better paid since the use of machinery became general.

The most salutary progress has come in the best way through the concession by ruling conservatism of an inch where radicalism demanded an ell. Where the inch is too long withheld the ell is apt to be seized with revolutionary violence. The ruler, whether an individual or a party, who does not concede the inch in such a case, lest the ell be later demanded, is no conservative; he is a fossil and a fool. At the present outlook

it does not appear that "Bryanism" if put in power would take even the inch. The inherent individualism of its controlling component, the Democratic party, at least would stand in the way.

What is erroneously and insidiously called socialism in the Populist and Democratic parties is a popular determination to do away with the inequitable and oppressive industrial advantage held by corporate combinations of capital, aided by laws such as protective tariffs and lack of proper laws to compel railway corporations to deal fairly and equitably with all alike. These people have no mind to take away unjust gains from the favored classes, but only to prevent them from making such gains in future at the popular expense. This is not socialism, in kind or degree, in letter or in spirit.

General socialism is a millennial ideality. In this country the obstructive character of our complicated lawmaking machinery, the all but controlling power over legislation of capitalistic combinations, and above all the inherent conservatism and individualism of the people, stand in the way of radical or socialistic legislation. It will be impossible for socialism to dominate or greatly influence legislation under our bi-party system. It will have to wait until its partizans become numerous enough to form an influential group in the national legislature, as under the German parliamentary system. As a conservative who has dwelt in the midst of an important group of our alleged socialists, namely, the Populists of the prairies, from their beginnings, I have to confess to a much greater fear of public injury through the difficulty or impossibility of securing needed laws and administration along progressive lines than through radical or socialistic measures. We have not had protective tariff laws because, as some contend, they are socialistic, but because they are essentially paternalistic and monopolistic, and therefore the very opposite of socialism.

It is true that the more emotional portion of Mr. Bryan's followers, incited by great political provocation, have made a noise about it far beyond the warrant of their numbers or their dangerous propensities. General Grant tells a story in his

memoirs which admirably illustrates this phenomenon. When he was encamped with a detachment of soldiers on the Texas prairies, one night they heard "a most unearthly howling of wolves. To my ear there must have been enough of them to devour our party, horses and all, at a single meal." To settle a dispute as to the number of the brutes required to produce this all-animating noise, Grant and a skeptical companion, "who understood the nature of the animal," rode out to the scene of the orgies. The hero of the greatest war of the century confesses that on the way he was so frightened that he was on the point of insisting that he ought to go back to camp to take care of a sick friend. But his experienced companion pushed him on to the test—which resulted in finding that the whole noise had been made by *two* wolves; and it is said that they were coyotes at that.

ALBERT WATKINS.

Lincoln, Neb.

II. THE EIGHT-HOUR DAY BY LEGISLATION.

THE widespread spirit of unrest in the labor world at present manifesting itself in strikes is a socio-economic phenomenon upon which we cannot look with indifference. The object of these strikes is, in many instances, the securing of an increase of wages, and in others a decrease in hours. The problem of increase of wages we will not discuss, except incidentally, in the present paper, reserving it for future discussion, and will confine this inquiry to the question of the decrease in working hours. The length of day generally asked for is, in most lines, the eight-hour day; this is particularly true in industries making large use of machinery. The proposition of a change to an eight-hour day involves fundamentally two questions:

- (1) Is the end, an eight-hour day, desirable?
- (2) What means are best adapted to the attaining of the end proposed?

First, then, as to the end; for if that is undesirable, the question of means need not be considered. In the consideration of this question, many elements must needs be taken into account; yet I think they may fairly well be grouped under three heads: (1) Economic effects, (2) Physical health, and (3) Social health. The economic effects will be considered, very briefly, with reference to production, wages, consumption, price, profits, and trade.

According to Francis A. Walker, "there is little doubt that all the successive reductions in the working-day which have thus far taken place among certain laboring populations have resulted in an immediate gain to production, while they have led to a still further gain in the productive power of the generation following." Sidney Webb concluded, as a result of careful study of the statistics of the movement in this direction, that a general shortening of the hours of labor may slightly decrease the average productivity per worker, but will, by absorbing a part of the unemployed, increase the total production of the community. In 1860 the general secretary of the Masters' Association stated as "a fact that cannot be disputed that the production under the eight-hour system that has been introduced into the South Yorkshire district is greatly in excess of what was ever produced when the men worked twelve or thirteen hours a day." It is, therefore, reasonably safe to conclude that, from the standpoint of production, the eight-hour day is not undesirable.

According to the best authorities wages generally are more likely to be raised than lowered, though it is possible they may remain stationary. Between 1800 and 1840 the skilled artisan in England had succeeded in reducing his hours of labor about twelve a week, and wages rose $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; since 1840 the ten-hour day has been reduced to nine, and wages have risen still higher. New York State witnessed, in 1887, 256 strikes for shorter hours, and in every one of the trades where a reduction of hours was obtained a positive increase in wages is also reported. In 1860, six years after the enactment of the ten-hour law in Massachusetts, as a result

of an argument made before the legislative committee by Edward Atkinson, who had always been an active opponent of the law on the ground that its operation was injurious to the workingman (as they had to work for one-eleventh less than similar laborers in other States), the legislators ordered the Labor Bureau to investigate the hours of labor and wages paid in Massachusetts, the other New England States, and New York. This was done, and the result was as follows:

In Maine,	-	average hours, 66 $\frac{1}{2}$;	average wages per week, \$7.04
" New Hampshire,	" "	66 $\frac{1}{2}$;	" " " " 7.44
" Connecticut,	" "	66 $\frac{1}{4}$;	" " " " 7.81
" Rhode Island,	" "	66 ;	" " " " 8.01
" New York,	" "	65 $\frac{1}{4}$;	" " " " 7.57
" Massachusetts,	" "	60 ;	" " " " 8.32

The result of this investigation—proving as it did that the average wage in Massachusetts was sixty-five cents more for 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ hours less labor per week than the average in Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New York—was far more eloquent than any words Mr. Atkinson could utter.

According to United States Labor Commissioner Carroll D. Wright, the result of shortening the hours is found to be almost universally beneficial to the wage-earner.

Again, it has been argued theoretically and proved empirically that the adoption of the eight-hour day is followed by an increase in consumption. And this is natural, for one of two things has always resulted: (1) higher wages in proportion to production, or (2) the same amount of wages distributed among a larger number of men. The new demand for labor would increase the demand for commodities. On the other hand, the same remuneration to the same number for shorter hours gives them greater opportunities for developing their intellects and tastes, which in turn lead to a higher standard of living, or, in other words, greater consumption.

As to prices, "no effect will be produced upon prices generally," says Webb, "but some variation may result in some particular commodities." This could readily be deduced from the fact previously shown that the equilibrium between production and consumption, or supply and demand, is not disturbed.

Profits, of all variants, are most likely to fall. But profits, as commonly though perhaps not scientifically considered, are made up of insurance for risk, remuneration for superintendence, and interest on capital; and, as the first two would probably not be disturbed, the fall would be in loan interest. "The main permanent results," says Walker, "are likely to be a rise in 'real wages' and a fall in the normal rate of loan interest." And Webb says, again: "The aggregate payment for wages will almost certainly be larger and that for interest on capital smaller than before." This may be accounted for largely upon the ground of the increase in intelligence among the laborers and the resulting advantage to them in the play of forces.

Trade in the home market would be increased by reason of the increased demand for commodities, and it would not be likely to injure our export trade. The first conclusion is based upon what has already been shown with reference to consumption, and the second upon the fact that similar reductions in this and other countries have not so resulted. In the case of England, its foreign trade in textile exports especially increased. Even now in England the cotton-spinner works fewer hours than his foreign competitors, and, what is particularly to the point in our discussion, he finds competition keenest where hours are shortest (in Massachusetts), not where they are the longest (in Russia).

Having shown that the eight-hour day is not only economically possible but economically desirable, we will consider the question from the standpoint of physical health; and upon this phase of the question I cannot perhaps do better than to quote Dr. Richardson, who has summed up the matter very briefly and forcibly in the following words: "Muscular as well as mental kinds of work demand limitation of hours. Among those of us who have studied this subject most carefully there is, I believe, little difference of opinion. Taking it all in all, we may keep our minds on eight hours as a fair time for work. We may consider justly that a person that works hard and conscientiously for eight hours has, for health's sake, done what is near the right thing;

and in some occupations the eight-hour rule is absolute for health."

While the case for an eight-hour day is thus extremely strong from the point of view of physical health, it is even stronger from the standpoint of social health. If you compel men and women to work so long each day that they have little time and energy left for thinking, they will remain unthinking animals. Wider education is, at once, cause and effect of the eight-hour movement. In fact, the real force that gives vitality to the movement is a spontaneous longing for a brighter, fuller life, and a deep conviction that shorter hours of labor will serve this end. Men and women who toil for wages are growing tired of being only working animals. "They wish to enjoy as well as to labor; to pluck the fruits as well as to dig the soil; to wear as well as to weave." On all sides there is an expansion of life. New possibilities of enjoyment—physical, intellectual, social—are being more and more realized by the masses. Among all classes of laborers the demand for leisure is becoming keener, because leisure means more to them. At present, part of the laborers are overworked and have not time for enjoyment and culture; and the other part have no work—hence neither the means nor the spirit for recreation or education. The former are working anxiously, almost frénziedly, lest they should be thrown out of employment, and the latter look longingly for employment. Shorter hours would accord better with the interests of industry and, what is far more important, with the betterment of mankind. I am inclined to think that we may safely assume that the majority will be willing to admit that the long hours so generally worked in many trades inflict serious injury upon the social health of a community.

2. We may sum up our argument as to the desirability of the end as follows: In the ultimate analysis the wealth of a country depends upon the intelligence of its people; and, as attested by the public documents of all countries that have adopted the eight-hour system, it has had a beneficial effect upon the intelligence and character of the community. Those

nations and those classes of a nation which stand highest in the social scale are those whose wants are most numerous. What Adam Smith calls the "extent of the market" finally determines business prosperity and industrial progress—in short, all economic movement. Now, the "extent of the market" is governed by the normal consumption of wealth by the masses, and the consumption of wealth in any community is determined by the general standard of living in that community; and the standard of living is ultimately determined by the intelligence, the habits, and the character of the people. Therefore, whatever tends to increase the wants and improve the health and habits of the masses must necessarily tend to increase the consumption and production of wealth and thereby conduce to industrial advancement.

The creation of capital is due to the energy and intelligence of the whole body of workers of a country. Where these qualities are, capital will be found. Where they are absent, capital does not come into existence.

The question as to the desirability of the *end* may, with reasonable safety, be answered in the affirmative. What of the *means*?

There are three possible means for attaining the end, *vis.*: (1) voluntary concession by the employers, (2) insistence by the laborers, and (3) legislative enactment. The first of these we may dismiss as being a thing for which we cannot reasonably hope, inasmuch as employers, with very few exceptions, have always opposed this and similar movements. Why they should oppose such movements has already been suggested in the conclusion that profits are, more than any other factor, apt to suffer. But why they are opposed is a question for them to answer, and one with which we are not directly concerned—so long as the *fact* is that they are opposed.

The laborers may act independently or by combination. Acting individually the laborer can produce no greater effect upon the hours of labor in a highly-organized industry than he can upon the tides; hence, if anything is to be accomplished by the laborers they must combine. There are three possible ways

for them to combine: (1) a combination of the unemployed, (2) of the employed, and (3) of both. The first combination is not workable, because they have not the money to maintain an organization that would be effective. The second is better, and the third is the strongest possible. But as a matter of fact the "unions" have rarely been successful; for, as peaceful means, such as petitions, conferences, etc., have almost invariably failed, the men have in the last resort appealed to force. Yet strikes have as a rule failed in attaining their object, and even where they have succeeded it has been at immense cost, financially, and not infrequently in human life.

We have but one means left, which is by the action of society through legislation. This has theoretically and empirically an immense advantage over the other means; for, as a matter of experience, legislation upon this question has been almost invariably successful. "There was never any legislation adopted in any country in the world," says one writer, "that has yielded such good economic fruit. It is the one species of legislation which has never failed, and its results are limited only by the extent of its application."

In England the improvement in the condition of the laborers and the absence of injury to the capitalists were so marked that this legislation grew rapidly into public favor. Such was the unexpected result of the ten-hour bill of 1847, both upon the social condition of the people and the business prosperity of the community, that Sir Robert Peel, Earl Grey, Sir James Graham, and other statesmen who had spoken against the bill rose in their places in the House of Commons and openly apologized for their opposition, and later John Bright admitted his "mistake in opposing the bill." These are extremely valuable, not only as examples of manly frankness but also as evidence in favor of the beneficent workings of the law. Such was the operation of the bill that after twenty-seven years' experience under it a law was passed in 1874 reducing the hours of labor still further. It is in those portions of the country where short-hour legislation has had its effect that exceptional industrial progress is found. And along with

industrial progress has gone *pari passu* improvement in the intellectual and moral condition of the laborers. In commenting on the attitude of the English laborers toward the Union during our civil war, notwithstanding the unfriendly attitude of their government toward us, a well-known American writer uses the following language: "We in America owe more to the results of such legislation than we have yet learned to realize." In commenting upon the effect of labor legislation, so conservative and practical a writer as Webb makes the following statement: "In no case has the legal adoption of the eight-hour day resulted in any economic disaster." It is manifest that the most feasible way of establishing the eight-hour day is by legislation. The answer of experience in favor of eight-hour day legislation is ample and conclusive. Wherever such legislation has been tried its success has more than satisfied the expectations and sustained the claims of its most sanguine friends. We are advocating no untried experiment.

Before leaving the subject I wish to consider a question often raised by opponents of the law—"Is such legislation within the proper sphere of State activities?" It is not my purpose to discuss this question theoretically; for, in my judgment, the test of legislation is not its conformity or non-conformity to metaphysical dogma, but to the requirements of expediency. Legislation is a matter of practical work. That law is best which works best, just as that knife is best which cuts best. In other words, the end for which a knife exists is cutting; the end for which a law exists is the welfare of the people. Perchance it is a gross interference with that metaphysical entity, liberty of contract, for the State to say how many hours a day a man shall work in a certain trade; but it is an equal interference with his "liberty" for the State to prevent him from working as he pleases with phosphorus; yet it does, provided such method is grossly more injurious to health than another. The justification is to be found in its results. *Salus populi suprema lex.*

In advocating eight-hour legislation I do not wish to be understood as asserting it to be a panacea for all social and

economic ills. I am conscious of its limitations. There are some things it will do and others that it will not do. There are some lines of industry to which it would no doubt be inexpedient to apply it, but there are those to which experience has shown that it is fully applicable; that is a matter to be determined after a careful examination of all the facts in the case. Our proposition—the Eight-hour Day by Legislation—is, therefore, at once progressive and conservative; its end is the welfare of the community; and the means are, as shown by experience, best adapted to the attaining of the end.

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I. CHINA'S DEFENSIVE STRENGTH.

IN matters military and naval, China is bound by traditions as old as the very stones in the great Chinese wall. She has bought a great deal of modern war material, but she persists in using it according to the tactics of her ancient wise men and chieftains, who fought with pike, lance, and bow and arrow. I am not referring to that portion of the imperial Chinese army which is equipped with the weapons and military skill of modern warfare, for this force does not represent China as much as the military training of a small portion of her soldiers by German and Russian officers. If there are twenty-five thousand men in the imperial army capable of bearing modern arms, properly equipped with commissariat, surgical and transportation facilities, there are no more. The army boasts about four times as many men fully equipped and trained for service, but the army has not the means of moving them, or of keeping them in supplies and ammunition during extended marches; and there is no available force in the empire that could be deployed to open and maintain a line of supply against the harassing attacks of the allied forces. If the European officers in command of this army would be given free hands, the entire force would take up a defensive position behind the walls of Peking. If some Mandarin, ignorant of strategy, is suddenly appointed to the generalship—and this is to be expected—it will only be a question of time when this army, the only actually mobile force of China, will go to pieces in an aggressive campaign against the allied forces.

As long as the Chinese soldier thinks his general knows something about war, he will fight; but if he has the least suspicion of his incompetency, he will bolt. When he is fighting in the trenches, nothing but an iron discipline will prevent him from getting up and making grimaces at the enemy in the

belief that it will tend to scare him off. That he exposes himself to the fire of the enemy every time he bobs up is a minor consideration with him. In making faces at the "foreign devils" he has honored a time-worn custom, and the mere fact of his having done so is dearer to him than any move of strategy by which he might defeat the enemy. His military training consists to a large extent in bow and arrow practise, but, as Lord Beresford observed when he was inspecting the Chinese army, it is not so much a matter of hitting the target as to assume, in launching the shaft, the "proper" attitude. The Chinese drill-master does not care how well his men shoot, but the manner in which they recline and hold their bows is incomprehensibly dear to him. Instead of wearing a sword at his side, the Chinese "brave" wears—an umbrella. If it rains, up goes the regimental umbrella; and thus a whole army corps will march even if the bright colors of their paper umbrellas attract the attention of the enemy. The "sword" is generally fastened at the end of a seven-foot pole of heavy, dense wood, and this weapon is used in the manner of a lance and a pike combined. In many cases the soldiers have been furnished with modern rifles and accoutrements, but the viceroys of the interior report that they have the greatest difficulty in inducing the men to keep the weapons, which they consider inferior on account of their small size and strange mechanism. The men are used to the guigal, a sort of musket of the old flint-lock pattern, but several times heavier, and having a one-inch diameter smooth bore. It takes two strong men to hold the gun on their shoulders, while a third shoots it off. It roars like a cannon and kicks like a mule, and the bullet is likely to hit anything between heaven and earth except the target aimed at. Nevertheless, the Celestial soldier wants the guigal because it looks formidable and makes a sinful noise. In Chinese warfare the object seems to be to scare off the enemy rather than to kill him off. When finally modern arms were imported for the imperial soldiery, no less than fourteen styles of rifles were distributed among the army; so that it was necessary to use a large variety of ammunition, which became

inextricably mixed between the different divisions. A Lee-Metford man would try to jam Mauser cartridges into his gun, while a Mauser man would be struggling with Lee-Metford ammunition.

There is no compulsory military service in China. Every man is hired at a rate varying from six to eight cents a day. On this pittance he is expected to clothe and board himself. A large proportion of the soldiers are married, and carry their wives and children around with them from camp to camp. If recruits are wanted, a signboard is put up in front of the colonel's tent, which seldom fails to draw the rabble of the city. The sergeants select the fittest-looking ones, and from these the colonel, sitting inside the tent in a red rocking-chair, picks his men. The test is simplicity personified, but not very thorough. The applicants are required to lift a bamboo pole loaded with weights at the ends, aggregating about 135 pounds, and those who can lift it over their heads are given 25 cents in "recruiting money" and enrolled as soldiers of the empire. It is not difficult to understand why the military strength of China has been reduced to one of passive defense, and why it is not possible for her to take the aggressive even if strategy demanded it. The organization of her army forces shows how helpless she really is in spite of hordes of fearless fighters.

The Chinese army properly consists of two main divisions, which, after a fashion, may be regarded respectively as the regular and the irregular troops of the empire. The smallest but presumably best drilled part is the so-called army of the Eight Banners. This army specially appertains to the Manchu dynasty, the reigning family of which organized it more than two hundred and fifty years ago. The nationalities composing the banner forces are three in number; namely, Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese, the last consisting of the descendants of those natives of Northern China who joined the Manchu invaders during the period of their contest with the Ming dynasty in the early part of the seventeenth century. Each nationality bears the Manchu designation Ku-sai. The banner division is in fact a Peking institution, with branches and offshoots in

the various provincial garrisons. A certain number of the adult males of the force receive pay as members of some of the military corps into which they have, from time to time, been incorporated, in addition to their pittance as soldiers of the banner. The current annual budget set aside for the banner force is between six and seven million dollars, but a considerable percentage of this money finds its way into the pockets of thieving Mandarin commanders. If this money had been properly expended since the war with Japan, which furnished the impetus for the reorganization of the banner force as it is, the Eight Banners of China might have been able to muster about a hundred thousand well-armed and fairly well-trained men, with commissariat and transportation departments. As it is, only about one-fourth of this number can be relied on to render effective service; and, led as they are by German and Russian officers of skill and experience, these 25,000 banner men are in a position to face an equal number of the allied forces with a fair chance of success. However, if the foreign officers in command should refuse to fight against the invading troops of their own people, which is not improbable, it would fare badly with the banner men; for, although there are many competent native non-commissioned officers among them, and a fair sprinkling of subalterns, yet no staff of Chinese generals could be formed capable of matching the military strategy of the allied forces. Outside of fighting this the finest arms of the Chinese Empire, the question of disposing of the rest of China's vast provincial army is merely a question of killing men by the thousand as quickly as they are thrown forth into range of the guns of the allied forces.

The provincial army, then, is the national arms of the empire—the vast aggregation of irregulars—in contradistinction to the banner force, as being a Manchu institution nurtured into growth by the reigning dynasty. There are more than half a million of these troops scattered throughout the provinces of the empire, and the estimated cost of their maintenance is about twelve million dollars annually, with allowance, of course, for the traditional "rake-off" for the Mandarins. They are divided

into land forces and marines. The entire army is an absolutely effete organization, discharging the duties of sedentary garrisons and local constabulary, but superseded, when active service is required, by the "braves" who correspond to our volunteers, and are enlisted and discharged according to the needs of each province. The officers of the irregulars are usually invested with rank as "expectants" of appointments to commissions in the regular service. The commander-in-chief for each province is the reigning viceroy. The force is armed and trained according to his ideas. If he is a progressive man—which few of them are—you may find the better part of his troops furnished with modern fire-arms and tolerably well drilled; if he is hostile, as most of them are, to Western civilization, only a small percentage of the troops will be found to possess efficient arms. It is safe to say that out of the half million irregular troops there are probably less than fifty thousand bearing modern weapons and capable of using them with discipline in the field. The army is scattered throughout no less than eighteen provinces, comprising an area considerably larger than the United States; it is cut up into eighteen divisions, commanded by eighteen viceroys, and it is so lacking in commissariat and transportation facilities that it would probably take over half a year for its various divisions to collect at a central point for the purpose of forming a united main attack. There is, however, not the slightest prospect of such a move. The viceroys are mutually jealous, and, as they are independent of one another as well as of the Peking government, it is not likely that any concerted action on their part will take place. Only a few of the viceroys governing the northern provinces are kindly disposed toward the Manchu dynasty. The government well knows that it cannot rely on the viceroys in the southern provinces, as they are only anxious for the extermination of the Manchu dynasty; and if they are to turn their troops to any account they may be found on the side of the allied forces, in the hope that their ultimate victory may insure a new and better government. In times of war the irregular army is officered by 16 generals, 64 lieutenant-generals, 280 colonels, 373 lieu-

tenant-colonels, 425 majors, and about 500 lieutenants and non-commissioned officers.

Both the regular and the irregular troops consist almost entirely of infantry and artillery. Cavalry is lacking on account of the difficulty of securing suitable horses in the coast provinces, but the Chinese officials insist that the irregular army includes a force of forty thousand mounted warriors stationed somewhere in Manchuria. Like the general run of Chinese estimates given to foreigners, this number is doubtless much exaggerated, and the alleged cavalry is presumably little more than a horde of reckless, but undisciplined, Tartar horsemen. Outside the unorganized numbers of "Boxers," which are not to be feared even if the report be true that they have been permitted to arm themselves at the Chinese government arsenal, the mentioned divisions of China's army practically constitute what may be regarded as her defensive strength on land.

Although several modern ships have been added to China's navy since her disastrous war with Japan four years ago, it is, in fact, more of a navy on paper than anything else. If the list were cut down to the really available vessels of war, which could be despatched against the fleets of the allied forces with some reason for making a show, the Chinese squadron would be reduced to little more than a "light luncheon" for the armor-plated palate of the allied navies. In spite of her new torpedo-boat destroyers and her new cruisers, mainly German built, China could not hope successfully to fight any one of the foreign fleets now anchored in the bay of Pechili. As a British naval expert said upon his recent return from an inspection of the Chinese naval forces, "in case of war it will only be a question of what foreign Power will bring up the vessels of the Chinese navy as prizes."

There is no reason why China's naval strength should be in this pathetic condition, for the government has spent money enough to warrant a fair result—had the work of building up the navy been intrusted to honest men instead of pilfering officials, who have lined their own pockets with treasury ap-

propriations. The Kiangnan arsenal is an exception. It was built by British engineers for the Chinese government, and is to this day superintended by an expert from Elswick. No Mandarin fingers were permitted in the pie. The constructing company had free hands, and were successful in establishing the only modern and completely equipped arsenal in China. It was built as much with a view of supporting the work of rebuilding the navy as for making ordnance and fire-arms for the army. The arsenal has an engine department capable of turning out marine engines up to three thousand horse-power, and an iron ship and boiler yard, containing a slip upon which has been built an iron cruiser of two thousand tons with a speed of fourteen knots. There are, in addition, a small-arms factory, manufacturing Remington rifles, the production of which amounts to two hundred a week, but which may be increased to at least one thousand on demand; an iron and brass foundry, which has turned out castings up to thirty tons each; a projectile department, with a daily capacity of five tons, ranging from the six-pounder shell for field guns up to the eight-hundred-pound shell for Krupp rifles; an ordnance department making guns up to forty tons, and equipped with a variety of boring and turning lathes; a steam hammer striking a blow of one hundred and thirty-five foot-tons; and a furnace that will admit work one hundred feet long.

There are several other arsenals in the empire, but most of them are managed by Mandarins; and, although the work turned out by foreign engineers in charge of the various branches of the production is, as a rule, up to the standard requirements, yet the Mandarins have been known so to interfere with the processes of manufacture as to make the output of the arsenal worse than useless. Thus, while the French fleet was off Tamsui—a British official is responsible for the story, which has the earmarks of authenticity—the 27-centimeter Krupp guns in one of the shore batteries had been trained on the "Gallissonière" at one thousand yards' range for several days. At the first shot from the French cruiser, all the Chinese artillerymen fled except one, who succeeded in discharging three

guns before a shot struck him and blew his head off. One of the shells he fired pierced the ship and remained imbedded in the woodwork, failing to explode. The vessel went to Hong-kong, where with infinite precautions the shell was removed and opened. It had been manufactured at the Foochow arsenal and contained—charcoal! The maker had, of course, been paid for gunpowder and pocketed the difference. Already in the present uprising we hear of Chinese shells that refuse to explode, and there can be no doubt that a large percentage of the projectiles made at the arsenals in charge of Chinese officials have been dishonestly compounded.

The Chinaman's idea of fortified defense is substantial but ancient. He believes in mammoth instruments of warfare, and huge walls as thick as they are high. There are probably not ten Chinese in Peking at this moment who have considered the danger to themselves of what they consider their main defense, namely, the great city wall. Here are twenty miles of stonework, with toppling towers and threatening buttresses behind which about two million people are hiding in the belief that the walls are strong enough to keep out the "foreign devils." A volley of eight-inch shells would bring down the strongest tower on the wall, and the tower in falling would do far more damage to human life and property in the city than the bursting of the shells. Every time a projectile strikes the wall some part of it is bound to give way, and the falling fragments constitute the chief danger to the inhabitants. When the French bombarded Canton their shells caused the greatest havoc whenever they hit the walls and brought down portions of it. Accordingly, the French gunners concentrated their fire on the towers, with the result that the city was demoralized after great loss of life among the inhabitants. Nevertheless, Canton built up her walls anew, being evidently as little disposed to learn from the "foreign devils" by experience as it is natural for the Chinese to be.

Although the forts are a factor in China's defense, they are probably her weakest spot. Exceedingly well gunned as some of them are, and occupying strategic positions of great im-

portance, when the fighting begins in earnest China will have so few thoroughly drilled men to send against the allied forces that it is doubtful if she could spare her best men to hold forts that, for the most part, would capitulate in the end from lack of provisions and storage. It is, however, likely that a few of these forts will be held; and, unless the allied armies succeed in cutting off the Chinese supplies, they may find heavier ordnance behind the fortifications than they are able to put into the field. The lack of transportation facilities, and the impossibility of opening a line of communication and supply in the face of the allied forces, will presumably seal the fate of even the most powerful of these forts.

In a critical survey of China's war material one is invariably struck with the stern way in which China will order ships and guns and ammunition, and the ridiculously childish fashion in which she, with a few exceptions, turns her war purchases to use. She is not afraid to spend two million dollars on a cruiser, but she is liable to put the ship in charge of some Mandarin who may never have been aboard a man-of-war in his life, who is sea-sick as long as the vessel is in commission, and who must depend on the junior officers for the management of the duties that properly belong to his office. A Chinese admiral squatting on the fore-castle deck playing dominoes with the sailors is not an uncommon sight. An admiral has been known to beat a sailor out of all his money and then turn to the quartermaster asking him to advance the man some money on his pay-roll so as to enable him to take up the game again! Wherever foreign officers and instructors are superseded by Mandarins, a similar state of disorder obtains. And this is unfortunate, for if there is any one great nation that has every incentive for maintaining an efficient navy it is China. Her seamen are among the hardiest in the world, she has many natural harbors and navigable rivers, and she has a large seacoast to defend.

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II. PHILOSOPHIC BASIS OF CHINESE CONSERVATISM.

THE religious or philosophic systems that have exercised the greatest influence upon the Chinese race are Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism; but Taoism has done more to fossilize the Chinese mind than the other two combined. Taoism had for its founder and expounder the celebrated Lâo-tsze, who was born in the year 604 B.C. It takes its name from "Tao," or "The Way," expressing not a Being, or Divinity, but rather the personified divine *mode of action* as seen throughout creation. Tao is the divine operation of things, and from it all things flow. Yet Tao, while producing all things in earth and sky and sea, never does anything! Tao accomplishes results in the government of the universe "by doing nothing." Thus Taoism as a philosophic system is the *philosophy of doing nothing*; and whoever models his life after the plan of Tao is acting upon the surest of foundations. "Tao does nothing; so there is nothing that it does not do." In this dictum, found in the texts of Taoism, may be discovered not only the kernel of this ancient Chinese philosophy, but the origin of modern Chinese conservatism and opposition to Occidental civilization and science.

The highest virtue that man can possess is the imitation of the ways of heaven; and if the world be ruled and sustained by Tao, and if vegetation sprouts and stars shine with no visible *effort* on Tao's part, then men in their daily vocations ought to imitate Tao's method of inactivity, and do nothing! It is action—doing; aspiring after new things—that violates Tao and produces all the miseries of mankind. Only a return to Tao's methods—to absolute passivity—can ever regenerate the human race.

Such is the gist of the Taoistic philosophy, and the Chinese sages point backward to the remote time when perfect virtue and happiness reigned because of the rule of Tao in all human affairs. "Paradise" was the state in which men then lived—

a state in which knowledge was never sought after, and in which neither virtue nor vice prevailed, because men did not strive to alter their condition. Thus the early paradise of the Taoistic system was an existence characterized by "doing nothing," resulting in the continuance of order and blessedness.

The ninth book of the "Tao Teh King," the Taoistic classic, thus pictures primeval man:

"The people had their regular and constant nature; they wove and made themselves clothes; they tilled the ground and got food. They were all one in this and did not form themselves into separate classes: so were they constituted and left to their natural tendencies. Therefore, in this age of perfect virtue men walked along with slow and grave step, and with their looks steadily directed forward. On the hills there were no foot-paths nor excavated passages; on the lakes there were no boats or dams. All creatures lived in companies, and their places of settlement were made near to one another. Birds and beasts multiplied to flocks and herds; the grass and trees grew luxuriant and long. Birds and beasts might be led about without feeling the constraint; the nest of the magpie might be climbed to and peeped into. Yes, in the age of perfect virtue men lived in common with birds and beasts and were on terms of equality with all creatures, as forming one family. Equally without knowledge, they did not leave the path of their natural virtue; equally free from desires, they were in a state of pure simplicity. In that pure simplicity their nature was what it ought to be."

It has been back toward this primeval paradise that the Taoistic apostles have ever tried to direct the Chinese people; and their age-long efforts, while not resulting in a revival of the primitive Chinese "Eden," have nevertheless fossilized and stereotyped the civilization of China to such an extent as to raise an almost insurmountable barrier against the influx of Western learning. The primitive Chinese "Eden" was a state of happiness in which men had no desire after knowledge or change; when they were virtuous without knowing virtue, and simple without realizing their simplicity. They lived, or existed, in accordance with Tao—doing nothing and desiring nothing. But, as soon as this state of passivity or inaction was violated, in later ages, by a striving after knowledge; when

men began to try to set up governments and rulers; when they commenced to think and learn: then it was that Tao's quiescent ways were set aside, resulting in social chaos, vice, suffering, and political turmoil.

Thus we see that government itself—the very laws that control the body politic—grew out of the sin of *activity*, according to Taoism. Says the "Tao Teh King": "Allow all things to take their natural course and admit no personal or selfish consideration—do this, and the world will be governed." Perhaps no quotation better than this reflects the practical working of Taoism in every age among the Chinese. "Acting without action is what is called heaven-like" is another Taoistic axiom firmly fixed in the Chinese mind, expressive of the best method of living and accomplishing things.

The Taoistic philosophy has been practised by kings as well as by philosophers. The greatest rulers of the Middle Kingdom have been those who "did nothing," as faithful disciples of Lâo-tsze; for the dictum was ever ringing in the monarch's ears: "If a prince proceed to active movement he will lose his throne!" The ruler's power falls and the people are rendered unhappy by every attempt at *active* government; therefore, for a king or prince to "sit down and do nothing" is the highest and best way to govern. This is Chinese Taoistic philosophy, pure and simple, applied in high stations, and no doubt it has done quite as much good as harm to the rulers and people of the Flowery Land. It kept the Chinese people at home, in the enjoyment of simplicity and quiet, while the rest of the world was bathed in human blood. It has made them a peace-loving and agricultural nation, dwelling under the benign sway of Tao, "taking no thought for the morrow" in its most absolute sense, and separating the Chinese from the outside world governed by the philosophy of action.

To the Chinese mind instilled with Taoism all things arise and exist from the inaction or passivity of the powers producing them:

"Heaven does nothing, and thence comes its serenity.
Earth does nothing, and thence comes its rest."

Yet in the midst of all this "serenity" and "rest" the Taoist beholds activity and motion. "All things, in all their variety, grow from this inaction [of Tao]." Hence it is said: "Heaven and earth do nothing, and yet there is nothing that they do not do."

So with mentality. The same philosophy rules the mind. Speaking of the *correct* mind, the text says: "Being correct, the mind is still; being still, it is pellucid; being pellucid, it is free from occupation; being free from occupation, it is in the state of inaction—in which state it accomplishes everything." Again: "Perfect speech is to put speech away; perfect action is to put action away." Thus the Taoistic classical books go on with their interminable round of axioms and rules of living, all centering in the philosophy of "doing nothing." Perfect government is "not governing at all." Perfect speech is "keeping silence." Perfect virtue is "being virtueless."

In the Taoistic system is discoverable the key to the present upheaval of conservatism against liberalism and progress in the Middle Kingdom. As the happiness of the nation in the past has been the outcome of a more or less faithful following of the Taoistic philosophy, so the breaking down of the barriers set up by this system, through the activities of the *re-forming* element in our own day, ends in just what the old Taoists prophesied. As long as both ruler and people sat still and did nothing, just so long quiet and peace would reign; but the hour of *activity* would end in political upheaval and misery.

Have not the old Taoists spoken the truth quite as often as the opposite? In their own terms, have they not prophesied for China just what has already happened in Europe during the centuries of great intellectual awakening? Progress invariably means turmoil and revolution. Activity in any field culminates in violent reaction. This is what is now happening in the Middle Kingdom. The Emperor and his reforming party violated Taoism by their progressive activity and fell. Terror reigns instead of peace.

No nation or people was ever so happy as the Chinese in

their policy of "doing nothing." Happy they have been in many respects through the application of Taoistic principles, although mental stagnation has likewise been a concurrent feature. It is because of this same Taoism—this philosophy of "doing nothing"—that the very jewels and precious minerals have as yet been unsought, for, says the Taoist, "not allowing anything external to affect the will is what is called being perfect." "Being such, he lets the gold lie hid in the hill and the pearls in the deep."

There is *cause* for everything. There is a cause for the present uprising in the great northern provinces of China, directed against the invading Western civilization; and it is undoubtedly to be found in the tight hold that Taoism has upon all classes of the Chinese people. It is not satisfying to us to ascribe the present reign of terror at Peking to mere conservatism, since conservatism itself must have an impelling force at its back. This force is Taoism, which for ages has, indeed, been synonymous with conservatism in the empire of the "Son of the Sun."

The Chinese people cannot be understood and handled either by missionary or statesman without a prior knowledge of those time-honored religions and philosophies that have engendered that spirit of conservatism which the Western world would now so suddenly break down by force of arms. It is a sad commentary upon our diplomatic and missionary staffs that their members seldom, if ever, have been close students of Chinese philosophy and religious systems, not to speak of their absolute ignorance of Chinese literature. Were our diplomatic representatives in China selected for their respective offices as much upon the basis of their familiarity with Chinese thought, custom, and government as upon individual ability in purely governmental affairs, thus permitting them to get into more intimate contact with the body of the people, the barriers of conservatism now being assailed might be surmounted and removed with less bloodshed on both sides. A prior breaking down of the gigantic barrier of Taoism would be a far more humane and effective method of reaching the heart of the Chi-

nese people than the use of cannon. Even should the allied forces of the Powers succeed in gaining a firm foothold on Chinese soil, still there will remain that mighty force—Taoism—to be battled with for hundreds of years to come; for it has made of the Chinese people at once the most peaceable and the slowest-moving race on the face of the earth.

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III. OUR ASIATIC MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE.

THE "Boxer" troubles and the subsequent war in China have resulted in large part from our efforts to force our system of religion upon the Chinese. That they should dislike our missionaries, whom they style "foreign devils," is perhaps natural. We would doubtless show the same spirit were their missionaries to come to this country with the view of converting us to their theology and philosophy. Yet their religion is older than and somewhat similar to ours. In their system is embodied the Ten Commandments of our Scriptures, and also what we term the Golden Rule.

While we differ from the Chinese and from other Oriental peoples in the manner of worship, and on many theological points, they and all other peoples virtually agree that there is a Supreme Being—that there is some kind of a Deity. They admit, by implication, that there is a Creator, but disagree as to whether He or His creation is self-existent. And it is this that gives rise to creeds and theological discussions. Whether they be heathen or Christian, no matter how widely they may differ in formulas, there is a stratum of morality underlying all, founded upon the soul of eternal Truth. While all religions are not entirely perfect, none of them are wholly wrong; for all beliefs spring from the *soul*, which contains at least an element of right and justice, even though the man be a savage. This stands to reason; otherwise how were truth and justice established on earth, and how came civilization to be evolved?

It came from *within*, because "at the beginning" there were no outside influences.

Since, then, all peoples have a system of religion based upon truth and morality, which qualities are inherent, why should we attempt to force our theology upon others; or why should they attempt to induce us to believe as they do? We do not *know* that ours is better than theirs. We *believe* so, from the lights before us; and they hold the same opinions. Nothing has been or can be added to the eternal truths that all peoples have evolved from their inner consciousness and woven into a system of religion. We have it on the authority of our own Scriptures that the "*whole* duty of man" is to "fear God and keep his commandments." Then it would seem that it matters not what formulas are adopted by the various peoples—since all religions spring from the same source. All human beings are endowed with similar faculties. Let the peoples throughout the world work out their individual destiny! This was evidently intended by the Creator, in creating them differently and in separating the various nationalities with different languages.

We have a wide field in *this* country for missionary work. In all our cities there are people suffering for the necessities of life; yet we send yearly large sums of money to our missionaries in China and other countries to the neglect of our own people, who likewise need spiritual teaching. They also need education, for before a person can be thoroughly Christianized he must be *educated* in order to understand the doctrine. The money spent upon foreign missions should be applied to the educational and other wants of our own "heathen." Our missionaries to foreign countries must first learn the language of the peoples they are sent to convert—or else teach them our language. This necessitates time and expense. In our own country this work would be simplified and less expensive, and no doubt more productive of good results; for the missionaries would not encounter that race prejudice which is their first stumbling-block, nor would they have to combat old beliefs and traditions.

All primitive peoples have legends of the creation, the "fall of man," a "flood," the "temptation of the Good Spirit;" and there are beliefs of a miraculous conception and the virgin birth of a god antedating ours. All ancient peoples have a tradition or belief that their country was the original "garden" of Paradise and the center of the universe. The Chinese whom we are trying to convert have an earlier and similar belief to that held by the Hebrews, as written in Genesis. Is it likely that we can graft our version of the creation upon them when theirs is more ancient, and especially as ours offers nothing new? The Chinese may tell our missionaries: "Our civilization is older than yours; why should we change it?" Many Chinese scholars claim for their country a civilization having an antiquity of sixty thousand years. Our is only six thousand years old, according to modern theologians; while our "ancient" theologians claimed the heritage of a much shorter period.

The Chinese may tell us, too, that they also have read ancient history and have received traditions from the ancients that antedate the Hebrew Scriptures, and ask us why we claim to possess the "only true faith." They will show to our missionaries (many of whom seem never to have read other traditions) that our system of religion was taken from that of the Chaldeans and Babylonians—likewise our account of the creation, the "fall of man," etc. The Chaldeans also have a legend of a war between the gods, the consequent fall of the evil god, and subsequent sin upon the earth. Inscriptions on Egyptian temples show the gods modeling man from clay. These legends and myths of creation descended to other races more ancient than the Hebrews, and finally the Hebrews "borrowed" them and constructed the history and theology of our Scriptures.

The Chaldean Creator pronounces his work to be "beautiful." The writer's conception is that of the evolution of earth from water—that all living things were evolved from water, or earth. The Hebrew writer's conception is similar, and thus he made the error of giving two different accounts of the creation in the first and second chapters of Genesis. He makes

the Creator pronounce His work "good," instead of "beautiful," as ascribed to the Chaldean God. It is also noticed by scholars that the Chaldeans wrote that the earth was flat, resting upon the waters, with a "firmament" above, which extended down to the horizon of the earth, and that there were "waters above the firmament." The ancient Egyptians had a similar view, adding that there were "four corners" to the earth. The Persians taught analogous ideas, but contributed nothing new. The Hebrews adopted these ancient beliefs and myths, adding nothing new—as is seen in the account of the creation attributed to Moses, who also fell into their errors—but changing the location of the Garden of Eden from ancient Chaldea to their own country, asserting it to be the center of the universe, and declaring themselves to be the "chosen people of the Lord." All ancient peoples made this claim; even our modern Mormons are guilty of the same egotism. A just God has no "chosen" people—he cannot be partial with the children of his own creation.

The Chinese believe not only that their country is the center of the universe, or the "middle kingdom," but that all other beliefs are wrong. They claim that their priests are as infallible as ours. They do not attempt to force their system of religion upon us. We would receive their missionaries very coldly—perhaps violently; yet their religious belief embodies the same truths that ours contains—the same substantially that are found in all. Truth inheres in humanity. China is one of the oldest civilizations, and was among the first to evolve a system of religion. The philosophy of the Chinese embraces more of human knowledge than does that of any other race, perhaps. They have a rich literature. They practised the precepts of religion centuries before ours was written. They have read the history of the ancient Hebrews, and of their long list of robberies and murders of prisoners of war, and of women and children. They naturally conclude that, if these stories be true, they do not want Christianity.

The Old Testament story has no place in any Bible. It is a detriment to missionary work. The Chinese are not more

cruel—not even the “Boxers” who have murdered missionaries and the “foreign devils.” Racial hatred exists among all peoples, both civilized and savage, and it is but natural that China, with a civilization and religion much older than ours, should resent our attempt to “Christianize” them. They have read that territorial conquest almost invariably follows spiritual conquest—these often go together. They are familiar with the bloody conquests of Spain, which sent out priests with its armies—the sword in one hand and the crucifix in the other. Millions of inoffensive and moral people were murdered because they would not adopt the Spaniards’ oppressive theology. They were murdered in order to “save their souls.” The Spaniards established the Inquisition wherever their armies conquered, and perhaps one million people were murdered in the “name of the Lord.” And yet their theology was no better than the beliefs they attempted to supplant. Indeed, the Peruvians were an inoffensive and religious people; so were the Mexicans, the natives of the Caribbees, and the Indians of California and the Southwest.

The barbarities of the Spaniards are unsurpassed in the annals of crime. Are we, an enlightened nation, to repeat their cruelties in China, in the Philippines, and in the Caribbees? We are not called upon to Christianize or civilize the world—especially as our own country is so rich a field for missionary work. In view of these territorial conquests under the guise of religious work, the Chinese naturally regard all missionaries as spies—preparing the way for territorial conquest. Furthermore, the missionaries, as a rule, are a constant source of trouble—in interfering with the local temporal affairs of the countries to which they are assigned. Naturally zealous, and often bigoted, they can see nothing good or just in any foreign institutions, temporal or spiritual—just as some of them interfere in politics and in other temporal matters in this country, and quarrel with all other creeds than their own. The Chinese say, philosophically: “You believe this; we believe something else. Why should we quarrel about it? Let us be friends.” But, with our “Christian” theology, it is “believe as we do, or

we are enemies. We are Christians and you are heathens." This is contrary to our own Bible, which teaches that we should love our neighbors as ourselves—or at least tolerate them.

The vast sums of money sent to China and other countries, to Christianize peoples who have a moral doctrine as good as our own, would feed the hundreds of thousands of poor in our cities who are virtually starving under the shadows of our costly church-buildings, from which so much Christian charity is preached and so little practised. The Chinese hold that they are already civilized, and that they are in advance of this and of other countries in that respect. Other countries hold similar views. Civilization does not consist so much in education as in morality, but it embodies both. The natives who were murdered in Peru, Mexico, and elsewhere in America were more civilized than the Spaniards who sought to Christianize them. They peacefully worshiped their own gods and were as devout, though not as fanatical, as their oppressors. It is difficult to induce a people to abandon what they believe to be true and to adopt a theology that is new to them. A mental revolution is necessary, and, as the metamorphosis also involves a change in habits and customs, it is accomplished with the greatest difficulty—if at all. These beliefs are so firmly implanted as to become "second nature"—they cling to the memory like the earliest recollections of home in old age. All peoples seem satisfied with the theological system of their ancestors, or that under which they were born. There is a germ of truth and morality in all of them; and from the spark of humanity in the breast of human beings everywhere a religion is evolved to suit the condition of each class and nationality, according to the quarter of the globe in which the Creator has placed it.

There is no "universal" theology, any more than there is a universal race. The claim of the Hebrews that they are the original human race, and that the Hebrew is the original language from which all others are derived, is as preposterous as the claim that the Hebrew Scriptures are original. Evidence is now available that these writings were taken mainly from Chaldean myths and legends, as already stated. The Egyp-

tians have similar traditions, and pictures have been unearthed of animals (which Adam named "in the beginning") that are known to have existed long before the Biblical date of the creation. The Chinese have a similar legend that the animals were named by their god, Fohi, whom they worshiped centuries before "Adam" came upon earth. They have in their philosophy psalms much like those attributed to David, and of a greater antiquity than our Bible. They hold the "confusion of tongues" to be a myth—citing a Brahman legend to the effect that a tree was growing heavenward, and, to prevent it from reaching the "firmament" where the gods reposed, Brahma blasted it with fire. They have a legend of a sunken city, which no doubt furnished material for the Sodom and Gomorrah Biblical narration, and also another similar to the sinking of the valley of Siddim and the sea of salt. In Indian mythology there is a story parallel with that of the surgical operation by which "Eve" was brought forth, and another that Ramba was changed into salt for inconstancy. The beautiful story of Joseph was no doubt derived from the Chaldean romance entitled "The Two Brothers." The Chaldean account of the "flood" is similar to ours, only that the deluge was not general; neither was that of which the Chinese have a legend. The Chinese have a tradition that their god Tu, born in the first dynasty, was of miraculous conception, and that a star lighted the way to his place of birth. There is a similar legend of the god Horus, in Egypt, and of Krishna. All earlier civilizations, or peoples, have the same traditions that we have—probably all of them evolved from the same source, the first race, or perhaps evolved from within themselves, out of the inner consciousness—of a god and a creation, or First Cause.

Recent discoveries by geologists in Egypt prove that the earth has existed much longer than sixty thousand years, as claimed by the Chinese, whom we are trying to convert to our theology, the cardinal principles of which they practised for several thousand years before the Hebrews borrowed it from the ancients. Tablets have been unearthed in *Babylonia* that give two different narratives of the "flood," precisely as found

in the first and second chapters of Genesis. While we have copied the error of the Chaldean narrative, the Chinese give only one account. And when our missionaries begin to tell one of these "benighted heathen" about the creation, he will blandly reply: "Yes, I have read that: your book contradicts itself—ours is correct. Your two contradictions do not make a right." And so when our missionaries are instructing these "heathen" as to the commandments, the birth of Jesus, the "flood," the "tree of life," and of good and evil, the "heathen" will reply: "Yes; we have all of these, and more." The missionary will thereupon learn that there is nothing new in our system of religion—that it was taught and practised by the ancients centuries before our chronological account of the creation was written. In almost every land to which our missionaries carry the Bible they are confronted with older systems of religion—embodied in scriptures not marred with the bloody records of a cruel race like the ancient Hebrews, who, instead of developing civilization and the sciences, were continually engaged in "despoiling" one another "in the name of the Lord." The opening chapter of the history of almost every new king begins with, "And now King So-and-so did evil in the sight of the Lord;" yet they claimed to be the "chosen people!" When missionaries tell this to the "heathen" the reply is: "Then your God cannot be just, if he countenanced such deeds."

This is mainly why the work of the missionary is not very successful. In every foreign land he may visit he will find that the natives have a system of worship to which they cling with a tenacity he cannot outdo. As they are sincere, they are to be commended and respected by those holding other beliefs. No matter whether they worship stone idols, the sun, or a brazen "Joss"—so long as one is sincere and honest in his belief he is on the right road, or at least he may be, for no human being knows positively which creed is the true one. All beliefs have been tried, and not one is satisfactory to all peoples. Each insists that its own is the only true one, and each system embodies as much truth and morality as was possible

of conception in the age in which the creed was written. While none may be wholly right, perhaps not one is entirely wrong; but, so long as his belief is firmly implanted in the breast of even the "heathen," so-called civilization will advance. Though individually they fail to see the good, the results of these beliefs are beneficial. All people wish a system of theology suited to their habits, customs, and mode of living; and it is generally fashioned to suit their nature and government. It may be severe or mild, according to their zeal or liberal ideas of worship; but when once implanted it is very difficult to change it—for it was fashioned to suit them, and they believe that it is the only perfect and true system.

It is held, and no doubt correctly, that religion is an accident of birth. It is shaded or colored by the age its devotees live in, or rather the century in which it was proclaimed. We cling to the religion of our native country as we do to our language and the customs of our ancestors. It is like allegiance to the land of our birth—no other country is quite as good as the one we were born in, and no other religion is as true as that of our fathers. Sectarianism is due to locality. We see only our own side—all others are wrong; and unless they believe as we happen to be taught to believe, they will be "lost." We persecute those who do not adopt our belief, as we persecuted the aborigines of this country. The fanatics of the Reformation persecuted "unbelievers" with that cruelty which characterized the Inquisition. Persecution stains the history of all creeds. There is an element of intolerance in each which, it seems, its own moral teachings cannot overcome. One is as intolerant as another; for the warring creeds have deluged the earth in blood and caused world-wide mourning. While the fires of the Inquisition "saved" "unbelievers," the fires of the Reformation and the gallows of Protestant countries were equally destructive in executing "heretics." Science was strangled—astronomers were burned at the stake for asserting that the earth is round and that the sun does not revolve around the earth. The "heathen" Chinese whom we are now trying to convert to our theology, which in most quarters is the same

now as then, had a more perfect knowledge of the earth and the sciences; and while they may be styled "unprogressive," they did not commit wholesale murder in the name of "religion." We style them a "superstitious" people; and, while the uneducated yet believe in "witches" and "evil spirits," they tell our missionaries that we have the same belief. They point to passages in the Bible referring to "casting out devils," "familiar spirits," "seers," and "prophets," all of which they have and now partly believe in. That one passage in the Bible, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live," kept the fires of the Reformation burning, and perhaps caused the sacrifice of more lives than any other scriptural injunction or any "religious war."

Considering the foregoing, we may ask, Wherein is our system better than that of the Chinese? Their system contains the same moral truths, and it also has some of our imperfections—dogmas that are not based on either truth or morality. The Chinese had all of these centuries before we received them, and they seem to be satisfied with what they have. They are a peaceable people, if let alone. They do not attempt to force their system of either religion or government upon other peoples; and as their theology suits them—being especially adapted to that peculiar race—it would seem the better policy to let them alone. Our attempt to infuse our belief into theirs, or to supplant it with ours, may lead to a war in which this country will become involved, necessitating a large army and great expense to the taxpayers. And for what? To make a people *believe* as we do. Their religion, perhaps, is about as nearly perfect as ours. Ours may be the only correct one; and perhaps theirs is the only true one. No one knows. In the absence of *positive* knowledge on this much-discussed subject, perhaps it were better to let each country and people work out its own salvation. There is a wide field for Christian work in this country—without going to China or elsewhere to seek "heathen" who have as good if not a better civilization and system of theology than our own.

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IV. PRINCE HAMLET OF PEKING.

THOUGH the Kaiser goes on pilgrimages, and the Czar of all the Russias preaches universal peace, yet both must yield the palm for pure idealism to His Majesty Kuang-Hsu, who reigns rather than rules over the Celestial Empire. Now that full details have come from China, we are better able to realize what a great and even noble dream was dreamed by the Oriental Hamlet, before he was so rudely awakened by the Dowager Empress, Tshu-Chsi.

Kuang-Hsu ("Enduring Majesty") is an imperial title. The personal name of the prince is Teai-Tsien. He is only twenty-seven years old, though he has borne the title of Emperor ever since the death of his cousin, the Emperor Chai-Chin, four-and-twenty years ago, and has been sole responsible ruler, in theory at least, for the last ten years. The Emperor Kuang-Hsu is slight and delicate, almost childish in figure, of pale olive complexion, and with great melancholy eyes. There is a gentleness about his face that speaks rather of dreaming than of the power to turn dreams into acts. It is strange to find a personality so ethereal among the descendants of the Mongol hordes; yet the Emperor Kuang-Hsu might sit as a model for some Oriental saint on the threshold of the highest beatitude. Though it is eleven years since his marriage with the Princess Eho-na-la, the Emperor is childless.

Not long ago, Kuang-Hsu dreamed a dream: China regenerate and perfect; four hundred millions of human beings, scattered over its four millions of square miles, to be free, virtuous, prosperous, enlightened; the Celestial Empire to grow in power till all the world trembles; a new spirit to appear among men. The Emperor saw that China, though once the wisest and mightiest of lands, and a shining example to all the kingdoms of the earth, was dimmed in glory and distanced in renown. Others have advanced while China has stood still, and now the once great leader is among the last. He found the cause of this

backsliding in too great reverence for the past; in the conservative spirit, fascinated by the greatness of the ancient sages, and able to conceive no possible change or addition to their ideals. And therefore Kuang-Hsu determined to cut the past adrift, and to advance boldly on new ways with new leaders and new lights.

He conceived the first necessity to be an infusion of new life into the education of the people; a transformation of that marvelous system of training, perfected centuries ago, which forms all minds on the great Chinese classics and finds its highest standard of culture in imitating the form and spirit of these archaic works. It is the battle of modernity against the ancient tongues, fought over again on Eastern soil. Chemistry and physics, engineering and military science, were to take the place of essays and poems exquisitely fashioned after the ancient models, which now form the sole test of talent throughout the Celestial Empire, and perfection in which is the royal road to fame and fortune.

It is difficult to decide which we should most admire: the genuine enthusiasm of all China for literary culture, for familiarity with "the best that has been thought and said" by the wisest Celestials, or the marvelous ingenuity and precision with which this skill is tested, by a system of literary examinations hardly equaled and never surpassed by any nation in any age: the vast halls, with their cloister-like divisions for ten thousand candidates, the seals set on the doors before the themes are given out, the counted sheets of stamped paper with name and number for the essays of every candidate, the army of clerks copying the finished themes in red ink lest any personal sign or mark should lead the examiner to recognize a favored pupil, the enthusiastic crowds gathering at the doors, the cannons and music that greet the first candidates to issue, the literary chancellor presiding ceremoniously, the list of successes eagerly bought up in the streets, the best names publicly shown in a place of honor, the chosen essays and poems sent to court, the caps with golden buttons and the blue silk gowns of the graduates, and lastly the almost pathetic provision that

whoever seeks but fails to gain any one degree till his eightieth year shall receive it free, as from the Emperor himself, as a tribute to faithful love of learning.

We may also keep some of our admiration for the more than human ingenuity with which the Chinese students sometimes evade the strictest precautions: the tunnels dug beneath the examination-halls, through which unlawful knowledge is passed up to the candidate written minutely on the finest paper; the offices where needy and brilliant essayists are hired to personate dull, wealthy scholars; the refinement of cunning decreeing that, while the rank of the examination to be passed rises in arithmetical progression, the bribe of the personator shall increase in geometrical ratio; and much more, which shows by crooked ways how highly the fame of learning is esteemed.

Yet all this will not win the battles of the world. So the Emperor Kuang-Hsu decreed reform and the introduction of Western ways. Peking was to have its university, steeped in the spirit of modernity: not only the finest European culture, but the last and highest version of that culture, as supplemented and perfected by Japan. For the drawing together of Japan and China was one of the most noteworthy things in the Manchu Hamlet's dream. "China and Japan," a recent edict says, "have a common language, belong to the same race, and have all interests in common." Therefore, a chosen band of students were to set out from China for the Flowery Land, as guests of the Japanese nation, there to seek the light, which they would presently bring back to their own country. Two hundred were to go as a beginning, among those having some knowledge of Japanese. And before their return, if the dream be carried out, Peking will have not a university only, but a whole system of primary and intermediate schools, on Western models, and not Peking only, but every considerable city in the empire.

The University of Tokyo, which is probably the high-water mark of Japanese and European culture combined, is to serve as the model for the new Peking University, and temporary quarters have been assigned for the teachers in the princely

palaces of the capital, pending the erection of suitable university buildings. Meanwhile the sum originally allotted to the committee on education has been increased threefold, by a special edict of the Emperor, and the sum set aside for the monthly expenses of the committee has been doubled.

The thoroughly practical spirit in which the new movement in education was conceived is shown better than anywhere else in an imperial order despatched to the authorities of the coast provinces of China; that is, the viceroys, the governors, the prefects, and the district magistrates, who form the four great degrees in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the Chinese Empire. The authorities of the maritime regions were directed to furnish the Emperor with precise information as to possible methods of increasing the subsidies of the naval schools and supplying new training-ships for the fleet. And another equally practical manifestation is the formation of a committee on railroads and engineering, with orders to furnish plans for the opening of schools of railroad-engineering at a number of central points throughout the empire, from which, it is hoped, railroads will soon radiate to every province and considerable town.

Close on the heels of this follows another committee, destined to deal with agriculture, manufactures, and trade. To the president and vice-president of this committee are specially reserved the rights of unimpeded access to the person of the Emperor at any time, should the duties of the committee make this necessary. When we remember the divinity that doth hedge the "Son of Heaven and Cousin of the Celestial Bodies," we shall better realize how much this Manchu innovator was in earnest. Further, a school of agriculture was to be formed, with branches in each district of every province of the empire, and these branch schools were to procure the latest agricultural machinery, with a view to its introduction broadcast throughout China. Besides the chief provincial committees, the viceroys and governors were directed to form local committees, under the guidance of three or four of the most influential land-owners in each district, to be nominated by the viceroy.

Another innovation closely connected with this was suggested by the recent famine and scarcity in the three provinces of Hu-pe, Shan-Si, and Shan-tung, all not far from the capital. The Emperor has discovered that the system of supplying free rations to the starving populations is not a success, or, perhaps we should say, the system of allotting considerable sums to that end. For there is the old tale of peculating and dishonest officials; and, while the sums are regularly drawn from the treasury, the famine-stricken people are in no wise better for them. The Emperor adopts the expedient of the government of India—the establishment of relief-works—and further intends to improve the occasion by setting the men on these works at various new industries or processes which it is desired to introduce into general use. This would cover the building of railways, the establishment of agricultural machinery, the extension of irrigation, and the establishment of new manufactures. So that a famine will come to the provinces as a blessing in disguise, a fountain of light and leading, the doorway of a new epoch.

Other reforms were either projected or already intrusted to committees. Among these, one of the most important is that which touches the procedure in civil cases. It is said that the Chinese courts have a bad eminence in the law's delays, keeping a good case—that is, one in which the litigants are rich—on the files of the courts for months, years, and even decades, to the end that bribes may be taken; and it is even said that bribes are very often taken from both sides, with a promise of a favorable decision for each. We can easily realize that, in a case like this, the judge would have some delicacy about pronouncing any decision at all, and so would keep the case going as long as possible, in the hope that one of the parties might either die, forget about it, or lose hope. Before we pass too heavy sentence on this special form of corruption, we should remember that Sir Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, commonly and wrongly called Lord Bacon, was degraded for selling the decisions of the highest court in the England of his day. Experience shows that this particular reform will be

one of the most difficult to introduce, because its success depends almost wholly on the very judges who are to be reformed.

Yet another measure for the enlightenment of the Celestials, and a daring one, is the foundation of a new medical college in Peking, for the avowed purpose of introducing the methods of European medical science. A license for this college has already been granted, and one of the numerous committees is busy with the details of its organization. If carried out, this scheme is certain to arouse great opposition; for it strikes a blow at vested interests of the most extensive character, and resting on very venerable traditions. We can realize the feelings of the old-school physicians in China by supposing a government college to be organized and endowed here for the introduction of mental healing. Our orthodox physicians would regard it much as the old doctors of China regard the introduction of what is orthodox medicine with us. It is true that Kuang-Hsu has thrown a sop to Cerberus by including in the course of the college the traditional medical practise of China side by side with that of the West.

But the next reform on the Emperor's list admits of no healing balm. It is a decree for the suspension of the Six Boards—a series of venerable bodies dealing with such matters as the education of the heir-apparent, the superintendence of the royal stables, the due performance of the "kneelings and knockings" with the forehead, which play so large a part in the ceremony of China, and the organization of royal banquets. These interesting institutions, with the salaries, are to be abolished, and their duties, so far as they have any real existence, are to be distributed among the committees of the senate. The buildings formerly occupied by these Six Boards are to be turned over to the university, the medical college, and the primary and intermediate schools.

This seems to be the first grave mistake, from a practical point of view, in the reform program of the "Son of Heaven." Like so many bringers of new tidings, his course might have gone smoothly if he had only restrained his indignation at the

scribes and Pharisees and abstained from interfering with their vested interests. The ostensible cause of the abolition of the board of ceremonies is a case in point. This board has always exercised a certain censorship on all petitions presented to the Emperor. But Kuang-Hsu has decreed that all petitions shall come to him direct and unimpeded. A certain obstinate person recently sent a petition to the Emperor through a member of this board, Val-Chao by name, who considered the tone in which it was couched rather offensive and one-sided. He consequently refused to present it to His Majesty. But the petitioner insisted and made trouble, and Val-Chao, instead of having the importunate man "removed," gave in and presented the petition, with a note explaining the cause of delay. The Emperor was indignant, and the board were astonished by reading in the next number of the *Gazette* that their resignations had been accepted and their salaries withdrawn.

Immediately the whole army of bureaucrats and lesser officials—the scribes and Pharisees—were alarmed. They began to work against the whole reform policy, with almost irresistible force. Rumors were spread that the young Emperor was vain and fond of change; that he wished to bring in the enemies of the country; that he had no reverence for the sages of old—in fact, the old story, repeated of every reformer. Things began to go wrong. The people were stirred up, and riots took place in several provincial towns. The Emperor tried to neutralize the mischief by publishing the following edict:

"The government of the Chinese Empire, striving to elevate the various departments of the administration, and with the sole design of conferring benefits on the people, wishes to employ to this end the methods of the peoples of the West, since that which is common to the Western nations and the Chinese has been brought to greater excellence by the former, and may therefore serve for our advancement.

"At the same time, the bureaucrats and scholars of this Empire, whose views of foreign nations are characterized by the greatest ignorance, pretend that Western nations are totally devoid of order and enlightenment, not knowing that among Western nations there are many forms of political science

which have as their sole aim the moral elevation of the people and their material well-being, and which, in their high development, are able to heap benefits on mankind and to prolong the span of human life. In the West, all efforts are directed to procuring the blessings which mankind is entitled to.

"In our ceaseless efforts to reform various departments of the administration, we are not prompted by mere desire for novelty, but by a sincere desire for the well-being of the Empire intrusted to us by Providence and inherited from our ancestors. We shall not fulfil our duty if we fail to secure to all our people the blessings of peace and prosperity. And we are not less grieved at the slights which China has had to submit to at the hands of foreign governments. But if we do not possess the knowledge and science of other peoples we shall not be able to defend ourselves against them.

"At the same time our subjects evidently fail to understand the true purpose of our unsleeping endeavors and exertions. The reason of this is, that the lower classes of officials and the bureaucrats devoted to routine not only do not make our intentions clear, but on the contrary try to confuse the people with vain and unseemly speeches. Grieved and vexed that a true understanding of our intentions does not reach our subjects, we inform all China, by the present decree, of the true purpose of these reforms, so that our enlightened intentions may be known to the whole people and that the people may know that trust may be reposed in their ruler, who, with the help of all, will mold the government according to new principles for the strengthening and elevation of the Chinese Empire.

"To this end, we order the viceroys and governors to print these our decrees, and to exhibit them on placards, and we order the prefects and district magistrates and all schoolmasters to explain these decrees to the people. And likewise we command the treasurers, provincial judges, district-inspectors, prefects, and heads of districts and sub-districts, to lay before us without fear statements of their views on all imperial questions. And these statements are to be forwarded to us sealed, and must on no account be kept back by viceroys and governors. Finally, we order the present decree to be exhibited in a prominent place, in the offices of all viceroys and governors."

For a man of common mind, the schemes already outlined might seem a sufficient undertaking; or practical considerations might suggest that they should not be added to, until a part at

least of them be carried into execution and have begun to work smoothly. But Kuang-Hsu, the "Cousin of the Sun and Moon," is evidently not a man of common mind. And the proof is that he keeps projecting ever new reforms.

The next reform we shall mention touches an evil of long standing and vast extent; namely, malversation of revenues, made possible by the loose system of accounts kept in the treasury department of the empire. An autocrat has been defined as one whose accounts are not audited; and, if this be so, then the Chinese Empire is suffering from an epidemic of autocrats. This time the trouble lies not with the scribes and Pharisees but with the publicans, the farmers of taxes, who bid so much for the right to extract what they can from the long-suffering ratepayer. The proceeds are treated by the governors and viceroys with as little strictness; so that, while the taxable power of China is simply enormous, the system of peculation is so complete that the treasury is constantly on the verge of bankruptcy. The estimated revenue of the Chinese Empire amounts to about twenty cents a year for each inhabitant. This is about one-fiftieth of the rate for most European countries, and one-hundredth of that of some. So that, if the revenues of China were raised to the same level per head as those of Belgium or Austria-Hungary, China would have a sum of from four to eight thousand million dollars a year to apply to imperial and administrative purposes. And, if the innovations contemplated by Kuang-Hsu were really introduced, there is not the slightest reason why China should not yield as large revenues per head as Belgium or Austria-Hungary. In that case, what an allotment could be made for a real fleet or army for the Celestial Empire; what sums could be spent on bounties, for the purpose of competing with Western manufacturers! The "open door" in China is one of those beautiful things that may work two ways. That door may open outward as well as inward. As far as the revenue was concerned, Kuang-Hsu's purpose did not go further than a stricter and more accurate budget—to put a check on the appalling leakage that undoubtedly exists. Even a slight

measure of success in this direction would raise the internal and external credit of China in a remarkable degree, with very far-reaching results. Among other things it would make the accomplishment of other reforms an infinitely easier matter than now, with a lean and dwindling balance in the treasury.

Now comes the rub—for this Oriental Hamlet: the consideration that makes futility “of so long life.” To carry out these schemes, or even to make one strong and effectual move in that direction, requires an army of trained and honest administrators; it also requires large material resources, to keep things going while the change is being made. It is enough to say that, while there are doubtless able and disinterested men among China’s four hundred millions, the Emperor does not seem to have laid his hand on them so far. The expedient which he suggests, or which had been suggested to him, is a remarkable one. It is nothing less than an appeal to Japan for the loan of a band of competent administrators and for a training for others of Chinese race. This is the true motive of the university on Japanese lines and the despatch of two hundred Chinese students to Japan. And in the light of this idea the recent mission of Count Ito to Peking takes on quite a new significance.

The best statement of the Japanese side of the question appeared in an evidently inspired letter from a progressist, in a recent number of the progressive organ, *Go-ben-bao*. The writer begins by quoting examples from the ancient history of China and from the story of Peter the Great, to show that reforms may most easily be carried out by foreign agents. He calls on the Emperor to invite Count Ito’s assistance in the task of regenerating China, and asserts that only by means of a Japanese alliance can China assume a firm attitude toward foreign powers and keep back the horrors of a general war. He says:

“If your Majesty could only persuade Count Ito to become confidential adviser of China, the reforms which you have undertaken would be promptly carried out, and the international bond between China and Japan would be still further strength-

ened; while, without such help, the immediate and successful realization of these reforms would be impracticable. Even granting that among the Chinese who have recently entered the arena of administrative life a few may be found with strength of will, they are certain to meet with numberless hindrances, caused by the envy and apprehensions of the opponents of progress; they will spend their energies and lose their reputations in vain efforts, and the ills of the body politic will remain uncured. On the other hand, Count Ito, as the experienced minister of a foreign government, who possesses your Majesty's fullest confidence, and who is well known to fame, would have nothing to fear from intrigues while introducing reforms; and foreign Powers, in their international relations with China, would begin to treat our country in a very different manner. Their schemes of aggrandizement at our expense would instantly relax, and this would be the beginning of the transformation of China from a poor and weak country, surrounded with dangers, into a land full of wealth and strength and rejoicing in the blessings of assured peace. This is the first reason why we must borrow talent from other nations.

"The fundamental principles of Chinese policy are isolation and separation, while among Western nations the principles of government are the very opposite of these; namely, intercourse and union—principles that serve to bring about the development of moral and physical resources while isolation and exclusion lead to the opposite result. To these two principles, intercourse and union, the nations of the West are indebted for their greatness and civilization. From the geographical point of view, nations inhabiting the same continent should first of all achieve union among themselves; from the point of view of race and language, it is best for peoples akin in race and speech to be united. The peoples of Europe and America do not inhabit the same continent as ourselves; they belong to another race, and speak other tongues, and therefore, in view of these natural barriers, they cannot enter into close relations with China. It is quite otherwise with Japan. Although, carried away by her extremely rapid progress and unexpected advance, which aroused the apprehensions of both Europe and America, Japan made war on us, yet, when opposed by Russia, Japan was quite helpless. It is true that, in order to oppose Russia, Japan is making friends with England, but experienced men of affairs are convinced that war between them cannot be averted in the future. Whichever side was victorious, there

would be great changes in the balance of power in Asia. England approached Japan solely because of Russia; England is foreign to us in race, and therefore foreign to us in spirit also. What if England should find it profitable to make an exchange and enter into an alliance with Russia? Then Japan, standing alone, would certainly perish. Therefore, Japan's natural ally is China. If China, with its vast extent, its enormous population, its rich natural products, should really conclude an alliance with Japan, borrowing from Japan new methods for the development of China's resources and for the education of competent men, then Japan and China, entering into a firm union and helping each other, could easily withstand Russia and guarantee a general peace. This would secure the hereditary domains of the Chinese Emperor on an unassailable foundation. Such an alliance with Japan is indispensable in view of Russia's extensive designs in the Far East—designs which could only be resisted by the might of China, acting under the guidance and moral force of Japan. As regards England, which is striving to maintain peace and further its own designs, its demands make Russia's policy necessary; but in reality England's designs are wholly commercial and interested. If an alliance existed between China and Japan, Russia would doubtless occupy herself with the formation of a congress for the maintenance of peace, and would enter into lasting and peaceful relations with the other countries of Europe. This is not only very desirable for China and Japan, but is an object worthy of the most ardent aspirations of the whole civilized world."

So far this admirable dream. Then came the catastrophe, in the form of the Dowager Empress, Tshu-Chsi. This wonderful woman is the widow of the Emperor I-Tshu, and was co-ruler with the Emperor Chai-Chun from 1861 to 1875, when Kuang-Hsu nominally ascended the throne, being then three years old. It is sad to relate that the Manchu Hamlet has been suppressed by this strong-minded lady as thoroughly as were the guinea-pigs in "Alice in Wonderland." The imperial *Gazette* announced, as everybody remembers, that, in spite of a world of good intentions, the Emperor found it impossible to deal with the vast mass of administrative affairs, in the present critical state of the empire, "and requested Her Majesty, the Dowager Empress, who had twice directed the affairs of

China with marked success, to lend him her guidance in the affairs of the empire." Then came three edicts: first, an announcement that the Emperor was very sick—quite credible under the circumstances; second, that several reforms were "postponed," the Six Boards being reinstated at the same time; third, an order for the arrest of the chief adherents of the progressist leader, Kan-Yu-Vai. This patriotic innovator had meanwhile escaped, when a new edict appeared, calling down on him the reprobation of men and the wrath of the gods, and declaring that even if he escape punishment in this world it will surely overtake him in the world to come: a papal excommunication, couched in the language of a ward politician. Finally, it was declared that the government of China would be carried on as of old, according to the principles of the sage Confucius.

So that, for the Oriental Hamlet, "to be" and "not to be" are still hanging in the balance. He is debating within himself "whether 'twere nobler in the mind, to suffer the slings and arrows" of his outrageous aunt and adoptive mother, or to take arms against a sea of troubles, and, by opposing, end them. He will probably debate and dream a long time. I fear that the world has little cause for hope from this olive-skinned Prince Charming, who begins by projecting the reform and elevation of four hundred millions—one-fourth of universal man—and ends ignominiously in the pocket of his adopted mama. Ambition should be made of sterner stuff. Still, it is good to know that this dream has been dreamed; for at any moment a man of violence may arise to put it into execution. The results to the world would be vast—immense beyond our powers of calculation.

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PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES.

THE problems to the solution of which the Commission headed by Judge Taft is now addressing itself are complex and difficult enough to have baffled the seven wise men of Greece. As military operations are at present happily coming to an end, while Señor Paterno, Señor Buencamino, and other revolutionist leaders are attempting to create a basis of mediation between Aguinaldo and Gen. MacArthur, the question of the practical organization of civil government will have to be attacked immediately. While the first Philippine Commission has done some valuable work in gathering much-needed information, its suggestions are too general—too little worked out into specific measures—to be of any other value than to help the present Commission to recognize the problems they are called to meet.

To understand the situation, a brief review of the essential characteristics of the government as left by the Spaniards is indispensable. In 1893 the Spanish government, under pressure from the natives, made an effort at reform, and by the Maura Law reorganized the government of the Philippines, introducing a small element of representation and local autonomy. Still, even after this measure, the main characteristic of Spanish rule was centralization. The three aspects under which we may view the Philippine government after 1893 are centralization, representation, and the power of the Church.

The governor-general of the Philippine Islands was the sun from which radiated all the energy of the administration, or, to use another simile, as his activity was not of a very life-giving kind, it was his hand alone that could turn the wheels that set the whole mechanism of colonial government in motion. The central councils that assisted him in the administration—the Board of Authorities and the Council of

Administration—were merely advisory and consultative bodies, lacking the power of making laws or even ordinances. Although their advice was as a matter of fact sought and the management of administrative details left in the hands of the heads of the departments, still, whenever any important or crucial question arose, the decision reverted to the source of power—the governor, who was always alert to prevent the growth of other prescriptive authorities.

Provincial government, too, emanated from the governor-general. There were in the Philippine Islands about seventy-five provinces and commandancies, varying in area and population from the province of Corregidor, with 16 square miles and 575 inhabitants, to the district of Surigao, with 7,265 square miles, and the provinces of Cebu and Manila, with over 500,000 inhabitants each. The provinces were either civil or military, the latter under the command of a military officer and the former under a civil governor who must have had at least two years of administrative experience before being appointed to this position. The civil provinces were confined to the island of Luzon. The other islands were divided into military districts. Each province has a provincial council consisting of nine members. But this council has merely advisory and clerical duties to perform, while the provincial governor is the real power. He in turn is merely a representative of the governor-general, upon whose orders he is entirely dependent in all important matters.

The same element of centralization characterizes local government. The local unit is the *pueblo*, an area comprising several villages with a head town in which there are situated the church, the monastery, the town hall, and sometimes a school. The tribunal or town council is elective, and is composed of a captain and three lieutenants. The governor-general is *ex officio* a member of every tribunal in the Philippine Islands. As such he may at any time interfere by his representatives in the management of the town affairs. Moreover, the governor of the province in which the town is situated may suspend any member of the tribunal, or even the whole council, if their

action seems to him to be contrary to the common welfare. Nor is this the sum of control exercised from above. The entire financial administration of the towns is strictly supervised by the provincial council. All town moneys must be paid into the treasury of the province, and are paid out thence upon proper warrants being issued, all the accounts being audited by the council. Any expenditure of over \$400 necessitates the previous consent of the provincial governor. All this shows how effectively the authority of the governor-general permeates all the branches of administration from the central government down to the smallest concerns of a local community.

Coming now to the element of representation, we find that, although the germ has been planted, it is still so weak and ineffectual as not materially to modify the essentially centralized nature of the Philippine government. The basis of representation is the municipal electorate (the *principalia*). The electors in the *pueblo* comprise the present and former municipal office-holders, and inhabitants paying an annual land tax of at least fifty dollars. This mixed office and property qualification excludes perhaps most of the educated Filipinos, who are engaged in the learned professions and have not acquired large holdings of landed property. These voters elect twelve delegates, who form an electoral college for the appointment of the municipal tribunal and the heads of the hundred (*cabezas de barangay*). The latter office is the oldest in the Philippine Islands. When the Spanish conquered the Philippines it was a position of natural leadership by hereditary succession—a clan chieftainship. The Spanish authorities retained the office but divested it of all its power and turned it into an instrument for the collection of taxes. The *cabezas de barangay* were made responsible for the payment of taxes within their hundred. As in the case of the *consulares* under the later Roman Empire, prominent men were forced to take this office and were usually impoverished in consequence. This personal responsibility for taxes was removed by the Maura Law; it had been a fitting part of a system that discouraged thrift and

prosperity by singling out the progressive and well-to-do men as special prey for official rapacity and crushing taxation.

In the provincial governments there is also a vestige of representative government. Four of the nine members of the provincial council are elected by the municipal captains of the province. These four members must, however, reside in the provincial capital in order to be able to attend upon the governor at all times. In the central council of administration there are also six elective members, chosen by the provincial councils (*juntas*), three from the island of Luzon and three from the Visayan group.

From all this it is evident that representation in the Philippine Islands under the Spanish government was limited in its basis and unimportant in results. The initial qualification was too exclusive to make representation effective. The higher councils, merely advisory in character, were elective only as to a minority of their members, the majority sitting by virtue of their office. Finally, the municipal tribunals were so restricted in their functions, so closely supervised by superior authority, that the representative element in them was fettered and impotent.

The church organization in the Philippine Islands drew its great power, not from its direct official connection with the government but from the fact that it was a vast, organized community—compact, thoroughly conversant with local conditions, and acting under a solidarity of common interests. Still, the influence of the church was also given formal recognition in the following manner: The village priest was a consulting member of the municipal tribunal. Although he lacked the right to vote, his influence was often paramount, as in many cases he was the only person in the *pueblo* who could speak the Spanish language, and therefore mediated between the authorities and the inhabitants. Each provincial council had two ecclesiastical members, while in the central council of administration the Archbishop of Manila and the "fathers superior" of the religious orders were influential leaders.

We have already drawn a comparison from the later Roman

Empire in the case of local officials. But also in its general character the Philippine government strikingly resembled the elaborate taxing-machine constructed by Diocletian. Even after the attempted reforms of 1893, the expenditures of the central government were essentially unproductive. Thus the budget for 1894 to 1895, containing estimated expenses to the amount of \$13,280,000, assigns only \$628,000, or about five per cent., to public works and institutions; while all the balance is swallowed up by salaries, pensions, and military and administrative expenditures. While an elaborate system of education was legally provided for, it was everywhere neglected, and the most meager pittances were paid to the teachers actually employed. Practically no public works exist. The roads are impassable for a large part of the year. Under a Spanish law, the natives were permitted to work off their personal taxes on the public highways. Making use of this provision the officials constantly made a practise of collecting the taxes and then reporting that they had been commuted for work done on the roads. They themselves retained the money belonging to the government, and the work was never accomplished.

It is the over-centralization of the Philippine government that has led to all the evils that have finally resulted in the downfall of Spanish control. It was this predominance of central authority that gave the village friars their great power—so much abused and leading to such bitterness against the orders as a whole. Feeling themselves members of the powerful central organization—irresponsible and almost omnipotent—the administrative agents and the friars totally disregarded the needs of local life and the dearest susceptibilities of the people whom they governed. They treated them as absolute inferiors, discouraged their efforts to raise themselves to a higher condition by education, and often even closed the way provided by the State for the acquisition of the Spanish language.

When we turn now to the demands made by the Filipinos—to the position they assume in their resistance to foreign in-

terference—we find that their main attacks are directed against over-centralization, against predominance of religious orders, and against assumed racial superiority. The racial problem is especially important, and has not been given its due place in discussions of the question. The Spaniards destroyed all social rank among the Filipinos, reducing them to a democratic level of uniform subjection. The Separatist movement in the Philippine Islands is a popular one, emanating from the masses of the people—not, as was the case in the South American colonies, headed by creoles and mestizos. Racial antipathies are therefore fully as strong as political considerations at the present juncture. While the Filipinos have not had an opportunity to develop a national existence like the Japanese, they still have a strong feeling of cohesion and of antipathy to the white races, of whom the Spaniards are the only specimens with whom they have come into intimate contact. The assumed superiority of the white races the educated Filipinos subject to a searching criticism.

In general, the Filipinos are ambitious for a good education, and give evidence of marked intellectual ability. Although their opportunities so far have been in every way restricted, they have nevertheless given proof of great intellectual power as writers, artists, and lawyers. We need only call attention to Don Juan Lufia, the famous painter, signally honored by the Spanish Senate; to Dr. Rizal and Don Antonio Lufia, the brilliant authors; and to Don Cayetano Arellano, the universally respected chief justice. Filipino writers and jurists have, on their visits to Europe, critically investigated European morals and manners at home, and have discovered and set forth in their satirical novels that the many failings and vices which European critics attribute to the racial inferiority of the Filipinos are encountered in even worse form in the old civilized countries themselves. To be looked down upon by every individual who boasts a white skin—to be treated as *anthropoids*, the favorite designation employed for them by Spanish papers—is therefore naturally unendurable to the educated Filipinos. The obdurate resistance to the Americans is due very largely

to the fact that the Filipinos fear to be treated indiscriminately as "niggers" by their new sovereigns.

The ideal of ultimate independence, of a prosperous and honored national life like that of Japan, is therefore active in all Filipinos who have political knowledge and impulses; and they will not cease appealing to the honor of the United States to aid them in realizing this ambition. Many of them, however, recognize that a transitional period is necessary—that there must be some training in self-government; and it is interesting to note the ideas brought forward by their representatives with respect to governmental machinery. The sources from which we may learn their ideas on matters of government are the constitution of the "Philippine Republic" of 1899; a scheme of government drawn up Señor Paterno and proposed to Spain in June, 1898; a constitution drawn up by certain eminent Filipino citizens at the request of the first American Commission; and the seven propositions submitted to Gen. MacArthur by the convention of Manila on June 21, 1900. The demands formulated in these documents may be summarized as follows: Absolute separation of Church and State; expulsion of the friars and filling of the benefices by secular clergy; decentralization of government and local autonomy; effective representation, based on a liberal property and educational qualification; responsibility of the ministry to the legislature, after the manner of the English Cabinet; and the safeguarding of individual rights by constitutional law.

In all these documents, the bill of rights takes a very prominent part—a commentary on the sad history of the Filipinos and an indication that their main desire is to prevent arbitrary interference with the freedom of the individual. For the same reason they demand the establishment of civil governments in the place of military authority.

The question of Church and State is the most vexed, complex, and intricate among all the problems that confront the Commission. The seventh resolution of the convention of June 21 demands expulsion of the friars, and it is reported that all the delegates of the convention vociferously acclaimed this

condition, shouting "Expel! Expel!" The provision of the Council of Trent which ordains that benefices are not to be held by the regular clergy has never been enforced in the Philippine Islands. The ecclesiastical law thus sanctions what the Filipinos demand, and it would seem that the only assurance of the future tranquillity and prosperity of the church would be found in organizing a native secular clergy. The question of church property is also exceedingly perplexing; but, were it once clearly determined that secular clergy alone were to be given benefices and that the officials of the church were in no manner to interfere with the administration of the State, the solution of the property question would become much easier.

In matters of governmental organization there are two questions that especially demand the thought of the Commission. The first is the question of decentralization—how far the local autonomy of towns and provinces is to be strengthened, and how far the power of supervision by the central authorities is to be retained. Many among the Filipino leaders favor the formation of a federal government, with the individual provinces organized after the manner of an American State for the complete management of local affairs independently of the central government. The latter they would confine to matters of general interest for the whole archipelago, such as tariff legislation, postal service, and national defense. The other question is that of ministerial responsibility. The Filipino constitutions and drafts uniformly provide that the members of the governor's council shall hold seats in the national assembly, that they shall be responsible to the latter, and that no act of the governor is to be valid unless countersigned by a responsible minister. The fact that they all make this demand gives evidence of marked political sagacity and knowledge of foreign institutions. If the representation of the Filipinos is to be effective, they argue, the executive must be responsible to the representative assembly; if he is responsible solely to the home government at Washington, the representative body will in fact only be advisory and will have no real power in important affairs. Ministerial responsibility, therefore, means self-government to them.

The first Philippine Commission in its report opposes both the ideas of federal government and of Cabinet responsibility. It argues that historic growth in the Philippine Islands can emanate only from the central government; the Philippine Islands are not analogous to the American States after the Revolution; and therefore the erection of autonomous State governments would be an entirely artificial creation. They are also opposed to ministerial responsibility, and would substitute therefor the responsibility of the executive to the home government; they argue somewhat sophistically that in being represented in the American Congress by a delegate the Filipinos would be safeguarded sufficiently against arbitrary government. This matter is of greater importance than the dry terms of political science in which it must be discussed would indicate. In fact, the whole question whether the Filipinos are to be given complete and effective autonomy or whether they are to be kept at least for a time in leading-strings depends on this issue. If they are to be given representation without responsible government, they will be in the position of an English crown colony like British Guiana, in which the representative institutions are merely advisory and consultative. The British self-governing colonies where representation is an effectual political force all have ministerial responsibility.

As has been already indicated, the positive recommendations of the first Philippine Commission are too indefinite and general to admit of being utilized as sufficient bases of action. The work of framing concrete measures of government has been left to the second Commission. The report suggests that the Philippine Islands be organized as a Territory of the first class, with a governor, executive officers, and an upper house appointed by the home government, and having a representative assembly with general legislative powers but with no authority to call the executive officers to account. The islands are to be divided into counties and towns; these districts are to be allowed autonomy in local affairs but are to be guided and supervised as long as may prove necessary by the central authorities. It is here especially that the recommendations lack detail

and will have to be worked out with great care, as the experiment of self-government will have its crucial point in the management of local affairs.

The Commission repudiates the idea of a protectorate over the Philippine Islands on the ground that, unlike the Malay peninsula, where Sir Andrew Clark made his successful experiment, the Philippines have no tribal organization—no hereditary rulers over whom residents and diplomatic agents could exert influence and thus govern the country. But the Commission, adopting a hint from the Indian government, recommends the appointment of a resident commissioner for every 250,000 inhabitants. This commissionership is evidently modeled on the district officership in British India. The Indian district officer, who controls an area of about five thousand square miles, is the personification of government and Providence within that region. On his circuits through the district he settles all matters, from private disputes and criminal appeals to the collection of taxes and the safeguarding of the most important interests of government. The district commissioner recommended for the Philippine Islands seems to be a mean between this district officer and the resident in a protectorate and to partake of the characteristics of both. He is to represent the central government in his district, to supervise the workings of the county and municipal authorities, to give them aid and advice and to check their action whenever it seems ill-considered or unwise. It is to be provided that advice when thus given must be followed by the local authorities. In this way it is hoped that local autonomy may gradually be strengthened as the people and their natural leaders gain experience in the management of their own affairs.

In dealing with the subject of civil service, the Commission expresses its belief that but few officials will be needed, most of the detailed work of administration being left in the hands of natives. The native officials are to be selected by strict competitive examinations. In a curious lapse from its sense of humor (if Commissions in general may be credited with this faculty), the Commission says: "The primary demand will be

for honesty and integrity; then for intelligence, capacity, and technical aptitude or skill to perform the duties of the office to be filled." A task, indeed, to arrange competitive examinations on this plan! The American officials are to be liberally paid and appointed by the President; whenever feasible, employees are to be transferred from the home service without special examination.

It will be admitted that the above recommendations regarding the civil service leave the whole difficulty unsolved. In the first place, civil service reformers will be reluctant to allow the President an unlimited discretion in the appointment of all the high officials upon whom the success of our government in the Philippine Islands depends. On the other hand, no satisfactory plan has as yet been suggested for their selection. The higher officials of the British Indian administration are practically all graduates of the English universities, who have passed a special examination before being admitted to the service. Before this system was adopted, up to the middle of the century, the prospective Indian officials were given a special education in training-colleges. The establishment of a training-college for colonial service managed on the same lines as the West Point Military Academy has been suggested, as it seems almost impossible to devise a system of examinations that will be a sufficient test of character and ability for positions of such difficulty and importance.

The condition of the civil law in the Philippine Islands also invites careful attention. All the writers on the subject agree that the Spanish colonial law, an agglomeration of inconsistent and incongruous systems and decrees, is so intricate and contradictory as almost to be useless; that litigation in consequence is full of delays and pitfalls; and that, in general, the civil law of the Philippine Islands is almost in the condition of that of China. In this matter, the government will fortunately be able to make use of the talent which the Filipinos themselves have manifested for jurisprudence. Any radical change in the customary laws must be avoided; but from out of the chaos, by gradual codification, it will be possible to evolve a simpler and more just and definite system of legal rules.

I have not touched upon the serious problem of the Sultanate of Sulu in the southern part of the islands, nor upon the question of the treatment of the many semi-savage tribes in the interior regions of Luzon and on such islands as Palawan and Mindoro. The area within which institutions such as those discussed in this article can be successfully established is comparatively limited. A large part of the islands must remain under military tutelage, and in the case of the Sulu Sultanate more than a guarded and tactful protectorate will hardly be possible. It is indeed the irony of history that the Sultan of Sulu should be our good friend, while our soldiers are fighting the people whose political ideals are almost identical with our own. However, should we feel called upon to enforce the provision in our Constitution forbidding slavery in any territory under our jurisdiction, the Sultan's friendship would be turned into fierce and destructive hostility.

The difficulties of the American government will be far from ended when peace has been restored in the Philippine Islands. The nation will then be on trial before the world on the question whether we can give to a subject population a government conformable to our own political ideals, and certainly it will take the greatest talents the nation can muster to solve the many intricate questions presented by the abnormal historic conditions prevailing in the Philippine Islands.

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AMERICAN INTERESTS IN AFRICA.

THE United States has almost as much interest in the result of the war in South Africa as Great Britain herself—from a purely commercial standpoint. The saying that has been so popular since the Spanish-American war that “commerce follows the flag” means not only the American but the British flag, for it is a notable fact that, in many of the British colonies as well as the mother country, American exporters have been very successful whenever they have tried to find a market for their goods. And not a few instances are on record in Washington where American merchants and manufacturers have secured more of the business of a certain section under the English flag than the English themselves.

In spite of the obstacles to development that have prevailed in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State through the policy of Kruger and his adherents, these countries have offered a limited market for mining and other machinery made in the United States; and many of the most extensive operations in the gold and diamond fields have been planned by American engineers.

The African territory that will be thrown open to American exporters under the new régime can only be realized by giving some statistics as to its population, resources, and area. Cape Colony itself contains 277,000 square miles, with a population in round numbers of 2,000,000; Natal represents 20,500 square miles, with a population of 543,000; the Orange Free State, 48,300 square miles, with 250,000 population; and the Transvaal 119,000 square miles, with 1,000,000 population. In addition are Basutoland and Bechuanaland, containing 223,500 square miles, and the vast territory represented by the British South African Company of 600,000 square miles. The latter are practically undeveloped and inhabited almost entirely by blacks, although the South African Company has begun mining operations and has constructed 1,100 miles of railroad.

In Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal there are but 4,000 miles of railroad, to serve a population of nearly 4,000,000 people and an area of 465,000 square miles. Of the United States, Texas most nearly approaches Cape Colony in territory and population, containing 266,000 square miles and about 3,000,000 people. It is acknowledged that Texas is deficient in transportation facilities, yet to-day 10,000 miles are being operated in that State alone—more than twice the mileage in the countries mentioned; and this calculation omits the undeveloped country, as it might be termed, represented in the British South African Company's possessions, Basutoland, and Bechuanaland—comprising in all 800,000 square miles additional.

Although the mining industry is but partly developed in the Transvaal, the annual output is fully \$150,000,000 in gold alone, while its coal mines are now yielding 2,000,000 tons yearly. It is importing goods to the value of \$70,000,000 annually; yet it contains but 1,000 miles of railroad—scarcely more than our own Territory of Oklahoma. While the Boers have devoted themselves extensively to stock-raising, all of what might be called British Africa produces a large quantity of grain, and other staples raised in the south temperate zone, in addition to its mineral resources. In the Transvaal the last report showed 12,245 farms, of which 3,628 were government possessions. These "farms" range as high as 15,000 acres each. In the Orange Free State 250,000 acres have been cultivated, although it is admitted that this is but a small portion of the fertile area of this country.

Ample proof of the encouragement given to American commerce through British colonial administration is shown in the value of our exports to the several colonies controlled by Great Britain and other European Powers. At present Spain, France, Germany, Portugal, and Turkey are interested in African territory as well as Great Britain. The total value of American exports to the Continent during the ten months ending April, 1900, was \$15,858,000, an increase in two years of \$868,000. Of this sum, \$13,168,000 worth of goods went

to British Africa, an increase of \$3,000,000 within the two years mentioned. Our exports to the French possessions for the same period were \$504,000, a decrease in two years of \$120,000; to the Portuguese possessions, \$642,000, a decrease of \$2,056,000. Egypt, in which British influence is powerful, purchased \$1,031,000 worth of American goods during the ten months under consideration, while two years previously the total sum was but \$436,000.

Turning to Australia and the islands of the Pacific, we find that the American exports to British Australasia increased from \$12,394,000 to \$22,826,000, a gain of nearly 100 per cent. In the German colonies our exports decreased from \$24,000 during the ten months ending April, 1899, to \$9,000 for the same period in 1899 and 1900. An increase in French possessions is shown of \$18,000 in two years out of a total of \$276,000. The Philippines and Sandwich Islands, which practically belong to the United States, are not taken into consideration, as the value of the increased exports to them would naturally be very large. The shipments to the British East Indies for the ten months ending April, 1900, amounted to \$3,987,000, compared with \$926,000 to the Dutch and \$100,000 to the French. The exports to Hongkong under the British flag have increased from \$5,187,000 to \$6,792,000. Next to Cuba, which is now under the American flag, the British West Indies are by far the best customers of American producers, our exports aggregating \$7,518,000 during the period under consideration, compared with \$6,549,000 two years ago. We sent nearly as much to the British colonial possessions in the West Indies as to Danish, Dutch, and French possessions, also Hayti, Puerto Rico, and San Domingo combined. Our British North American exports amounted to \$78,097,000, an increase of nearly \$12,000,000 in two years.

These statistics will enable the reader to form a more intelligent conception of what further English control in Africa means to this country. The exports include corn, wheat, flour, railroad material, clothing, material for telegraph and telephone lines, sewing machines, leather goods, foot-wear, oils, canned

goods and salted meats, lard, tobacco and its products, furniture, and even molasses.

One of the great demands that American manufacturers will have an opportunity to fill is for railway material. The war has taught Her Majesty's government a lesson by bitter experience, which it will not soon forget. The necessity of a railway system that will be broad enough to reach every strategic point is imperative aside from commercial demands. It is absolutely necessary for the prompt transportation of troops and military equipment to various points of what is really a great empire. It is also a probability of the near future that the Cape to Cairo Railroad—one of the favorite schemes of Cecil Rhodes—will be pushed to completion. The obstacles in the way of this system are by no means insurmountable, and it is calculated that it can be built at far less expense than the Siberian, which is now approaching completion and which is largely laid with rails made in the United States. This line, running as it would north and south through the heart of Africa, will give Great Britain the supremacy of the Dark Continent, with its northern terminus in Egypt under the British flag and its southern in Cape Colony under the same control. From a diplomatic and military point of view, it would be one of the greatest accomplishments of the century, to say nothing of its prominence as an engineering feat. Based on the ordinary requirements of a population such as could utilize transportation facilities, 5,000 to 10,000 miles of line should be constructed in Cape Colony, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal, as soon as the necessary arrangements can be made.

It is generally admitted that, although the mining operations in South Africa have been conducted on a very large scale, the work will be pushed on much broader lines now that England controls the situation; and under a liberal and progressive administration, such as may be expected from the British government, many new companies will be formed and an enormous amount of capital invested in the further exploitation of the gold and diamond fields. This will, of course,

require a large amount of additional machinery and the employment of skilled mining engineers. Reports from Great Britain are to the effect that encouragement will be given to all who desire to settle in South Africa and to engage in agricultural pursuits, by the donation of farm sites and other lands, and that British soldiers who desire to become citizens of the new colonies will be given all the assistance possible. Probably a portion of the Boer population may migrate, although it is doubtful if the exodus assumes the proportions that have been predicted; but it is safe to say that the vacant space will rapidly be filled and that the naturally abundant resources will attract settlers not only from Great Britain but from other portions of the world. All this means a great demand for such American manufactures as farming machinery, vehicles, wearing apparel, hardware, and a thousand other articles. The settlement of the country means an increase in population of the cities, with a proportionate expansion in local business that should be attended by the prosperity consequent upon the settlement of so rich a territory.

As already noted, the United States now enjoys a fair export trade with Cape Colony and some of the other sections of Africa. Two steamship lines are in regular service from New York, while nearly all the passenger companies operating fleets between New York, Liverpool, and London have close connections with the Castle and other lines sailing direct for South Africa, by which tickets can be sold in New York City for a single or round trip to Capetown. With the development of the American merchant marine there is a strong possibility that one or more lines may also be established to Capetown and other South African ports from the United States, which will be operated under the American flag, as the volume of export trade offering will assume such proportions that undoubtedly full cargoes can be obtained on this side, with the prospect of a fair amount of the African products at present so largely used in the United States for return cargoes.

At first glance the description of the situation may seem to be overdrawn, but, based upon the success of American ex-

porters in other parts of the British Empire, it is a question if the possibilities of trade in South Africa have not been underestimated rather than overestimated. To-day rails from America are being laid down on government and other railroads in Australia, India, Canada, and even in England itself, a recent consignment being sent from Sparrow's Point for use in the heart of London. American coal is being shipped to British naval stations in nearly every part of the globe, while at present the question of furnishing it to several English companies is actually under consideration. American electrical machinery is going into a number of the British colonies as well as to the mother country. American bridge-builders have erected structures in British Africa and Asia, and are planning additional ones to be used by railway companies and other corporations.

With such a population as South Africa contains, and with such a country as will be developed by the extension of English control, it can safely be asserted that a market will be opened to the manufacturers of the United States that is almost limitless.

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INDIA'S FAMINE AND ITS CAUSE.

ANY form of money, to be effective in promoting industry and productiveness (the purpose of money) in such countries as India, China, Japan, the Philippines, Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and even in our Southern States, must have an intrinsic value equal to its current value; it must be money that the laboring class can hide away or hoard without any risk of loss by depreciation. These peoples have not yet reached the credit stage of industrial civilization; they are distrustful of paper money and will not take it if they can get metallic money. Their first savings are generally taken from the currency and hidden away, not put in bank. This natural disposition should be encouraged rather than thwarted, for every such hoard is a stimulus to individual industry. The consciousness of his hoard makes a man more industrious whether he is working for himself or for a master; his interest has become identified with the support and conservation of order and peaceable government.

The famine in British India to-day is, as was that of 1897, a direct consequence of the demonetization of silver in 1893, whereby a factitious current value was given to the rupee. The laboring millions of India, the *ryots*, who are the cultivators of the soil, had long been in the habit of putting all their savings into silver bangles or other silver ornaments, and it was upon these small hoards that they depended to enable them to bridge a season of short crops or of famine. The effect of demonetization upon these hoards was first to rob them of a portion of their marketable value and thereafter to deprive them, and all the uncoined silver in British India, of that superiority in stability and exchangeability over all other commodities which is always possessed by the metal that constitutes the currency and is the monetary standard of a people. The effect of demonetization was, in short, to thwart and dis-

courage the wholesome practise of saving, and to impress the *ryot* with hopelessness.

An article in *The Nation* (New York) of May 3d, entitled "The Famine in India," by Professor Washburn Hopkins, of Yale, who is presumably an authority, scornfully repudiates the idea that the efforts of the Indian government to force a gold standard upon that country have anything to do with the famine, and urges that the only thing to be considered at present is the best and speediest means of relieving the sufferers from the famine. I should be sorry to say any word that would tend in the slightest degree to lessen the efforts of our people to help these unfortunates; but if false monetary ruling is the cause of the famine, as I believe it to be, it cannot be inappropriate nor premature to state the fact now, so that the proper remedy may be found and applied. Certain it is that charity is not that remedy. Professor Hopkins is inclined to hold the Hindu *ryot* responsible for famine conditions, because under native rule "centuries of oppression had left him helpless and improvident." But, it may be asked, what of the one hundred and fifty years of British administration that have since intervened? Had not the more intelligent and less oppressive rule in some degree changed the *ryot's* nature and habits for the better? The evidences are that it had; with the result that, prior to 1893, when the government changed its monetary policy, British India as a whole was gradually outgrowing famine conditions. There had been no general famine in India between the years 1875 and 1897, while throughout this period the country had been very prosperous.

Sir Alexander McKenzie, for some years governor of Bengal and for thirty-six years in the India Civil Service, has testified (Blue Book C—9222) that the famine of 1897 was "every bit as severe as that of 1875." This he states from personal knowledge and observation. He also says, "I was greatly struck last year [1897] by the improved strength of the cultivators in meeting distress;" a strength, be it noted, which had been growing during twenty years of prosperity, but

which under the changed conditions is gradually failing, as is shown by the *ryot's* reduced ability to meet the present famine, the severity of which is increased by that very inability.

This view is sustained also by the latest trade-tables of British India, published in 1900 (Blue Book Cd—26), which show that while there had been a remarkably uniform increase of imports, averaging 6 per cent. per annum for twenty years prior to 1893-4, the increase reported for the subsequent four years (or since closure) is less than 1 per cent. per annum. These tables also show that there was an increase of 57 per cent. in the exports for the fourteen years immediately preceding 1893-4, and an increase of only 8 per cent. for the subsequent five years. This shrinkage in imports and exports is conclusive evidence of a shrinkage in the productive power of the people, a natural sequence of which shrinkage is reduced financial and therefore reduced physical power to resist famine.

If we will examine the testimony taken before a "committee appointed to inquire into the Indian currency," we shall find that the weight of this testimony is in favor of reopening the mints. I select Blue Book C—9222, as the testimony printed in this volume was all taken between November 4, 1898, and March 17, 1899, fully six years after the closing of the mints. I speak of "weight of testimony" because, of the twenty-five witnesses examined, fourteen were against closure, two were neutral, and nine were for closure; of these nine, four were connected either with the administrative or with the civil service of India. But, in the relation of the witnesses to the subject and in the character of the testimony given, the preponderance against closure is, in my judgment, very much greater. One has to read the testimony in order to appreciate it fully. The arguments of Sir Robert Giffen, of Sir John Lubbock, and of Robert Barclay, in favor of open mints, are unanswerable. Robert Barclay, as president of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, appeared before the committee in support of a resolution against closure which maintained that "it is neither possible nor expedient to establish a gold standard with a gold currency in India;" an absolutely correct state-

ment, though the present government of India appears to be of opinion that it can accomplish the feat.

A remarkable feature of this testimony is that the very class that was to be benefited by the fixity of exchange which it was presumed would result from closure was opposed to closure. In a letter dated March 3, 1898, addressed to the Secretary of State for India, in London, by the government of India, and published in Blue Book C—844, the statement is made that "stability of exchange was the main object of the policy adopted in 1893;" yet of the class referred to—merchants and bankers—twelve of the fourteen examined were opposed to closure. Sir John Lubbock said: "The inconvenience of a fluctuating exchange has been considerably exaggerated; . . . the internal trade of a country is of much more importance than the external." Donald Graham, of Glasgow, Indian merchant, said: "Too much stress is laid on the difficulties of the government, and too little thought given to the interests and wishes of the people. . . . India needs a free, large, cheap, and abundant currency." Sir Robert Giffen, of the London Board of Trade, said: "The difficulty of the Indian government in adjusting its budget was the serious matter." Henry Bois, chairman of the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, said, "Fixity of exchange is not an essential factor." These are a few specimens, taken almost at random, of the way in which many of the witnesses received the government's assertion that a stable exchange was what it had chiefly in view in its change of monetary policy. The fact is that opposition to closure was the attitude taken by a great majority of the men connected with the trade, commerce, banking, and industrial development of India.

A little study of these Blue Books must convince any one that, in closing the mints, the India government was not consulting the interests of the merchants, the bankers, or the producers of India. Nor does the ostensible motive, "stability of exchange," seem to have been even a secondary consideration with that government; indeed, we have the testimony of one who was instrumental in procuring closure

and who still favors it that "the real motive cause was the great embarrassment of the financial department of the Indian government." There had been a deficit in the revenue, and "the Finance Minister did not see his way to any mode of filling that deficit by the imposition of taxes." (The Right Hon. Leonard Courtney, M. P.—Blue Book C—9222.) The question of revenue runs all through the testimony given, and there is entire unanimity of opinion that no increase of taxes can be borne by the people. Earl Northbrook declared that "to increase taxation would be unwise and dangerous" to the maintenance of British rule in India. There had been practically no deficit in revenue in the twenty years preceding 1892, and the deficit in March, 1893, was only Rx. 2,398,000 (Rx.=10 rupees), or about £1,500,000. But, to an Indian Administrator, any deficit is a grave matter; it affects his status in the official service of the British Empire. Famine can be easily explained in a way that will save him from blame—"drought and short crops," or "the helplessness and improvidence of the cultivators," will suffice to satisfy the home government and people; but let a question arise as to the payment of interest on the debt due by India to England, and the Administrator will at once find himself in serious trouble.

If, then, we will keep in mind the paramount importance of a good budget, together with the responsibility thrown upon the Viceroy and his Council in India (coöperating with the Secretary of State for India, in London) to produce such a budget, and if in addition to these facts we will allow for a lack, on the part of these gentlemen, of knowledge of certain economic principles, we shall be in a position to understand why, in the matter of closure, the Indian government acted in opposition to the business interests and best business judgment of the country. As a specimen of the economic ignorance referred to, I quote again from Blue Book C—844, which is a correspondence between the Council Board in India and Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, in London: "Our experience since 1893 has put beyond doubt one of the

main principles upon which the legislation of that year was based—a principle which was challenged at the time—namely, *that a contraction in the volume of our silver currency, with reference to the demands of trade, has the direct effect of raising its exchangeable value in relation to gold.* Now, who was it that “challenged” this economic principle? It would be interesting to know, for certainly no one who has given any thought to the subject has ever questioned it. Whatever the currency may be, whether gold, silver, or paper, if the volume is restricted below the needs and all substitutes barred from entering, the value *must rise*, not only “in relation to gold,” but to all other commodities. As a matter of course, these gentlemen understood that if the rupee had been made redeemable in gold at the rate fixed (1s. 4d.) it would maintain that value in the circulation; for they had before them the concrete example of silver so circulating in England and in the United States. But their plan to force up the value of the rupee was not by redeeming it in gold but by contracting the volume of the currency, and the success of this plan was what amazed them and led them to believe that they had discovered a new principle in economics.

There was no ground for their astonishment; by this same process the rupee can be carried up to two shillings if desired—but at what a cost! The people must have a common medium of exchange, whatever its price, or go back to barter and barbarism; and they must have a supply of this medium sufficient to meet every need at every point where production is possible, or their trading will decline and with it their productive power. As well might the government issue a mandate substituting forked sticks for steel plows as to deprive India of a “*free, large, cheap, and abundant currency*,” for the former course would be no more certain than the latter to reduce the productive ability of the cultivators. Yet to deprive India of such a currency is what the Indian government, in its ignorance of economic principles, has done; and that revenue which it was acknowledged could not be increased by additional taxation has been increased by a sort of thumb-screw process,

which in its operation diminishes the ability of the *ryot* to pay these taxes.

To increase the revenue by giving a false current value to the rupee may seem to the gentlemen who meet in council at Government House, Calcutta, an unimportant proceeding, but to the millions of poor cultivators it is a very serious matter. In adopting their monetary rulings, these gentlemen do not look below the commercial and banking level for indications of what is needed; if they would, they might discover that the cultivator is prompted to industry in his small way by precisely the same incentive that prompts the merchant or banker to activity—a desire to better his worldly condition. They might also discover that, in the interdependent relation of merchant, banker, and cultivator, the last is the most important factor; that he is, in fact, the tap-root of India's industrial growth.

It follows, therefore, that in framing a monetary system for India the needs of the cultivator must be taken into account as fully as the needs of the merchant or the banker. And properly to appreciate these needs we must bear in mind that the merchants and bankers are in the credit stage of industrial progress, whereas the cultivators have not yet reached that stage. The merchants and bankers may use gold money and paper money, but the cultivators cannot use either, because gold is too costly a metal to circulate and subserve the purpose of money among a people so poor, and whose trade transactions, though innumerable and large in the aggregate, are individually small; and because paper is credit-money. With the cultivator, credit has not yet become a factor in trade; he must have an equivalent in hand for value parted with; he has no banks, for banks only come into existence when confidence and the disposition to give credit permeate a community. It is only a little over two hundred years since banks became a part of the industrial mechanism in England. In India there are, however, numerous money lenders, or usurers, who live and thrive through the necessities of the cultivators by making advances to them upon the security of their crops or of their silver hoardings.

If these conditions are carefully considered, it will be seen that the currency of the cultivator should be metallic, and that the coin that constitutes this currency should have a marketable value as bullion exactly equal to its current value as money. With the mints always open to coin for individual account, this is what the currency would be; for then the coins could pass at no other than their bullion value. This was the character of the rupee currency prior to 1893; it was then true money: it is now fiat money.

Prior to 1893 the rupee served the cultivator as a measure of weight as well as of value; it was the *tola* (180 grs.) that went into one scale when his ornaments went into the other, in order that he might ascertain their market value when he had occasion to pledge or sell them. That these ornaments were always worth their weight in rupees he knew perfectly, in spite of his ignorance of finance; to him it must have seemed, indeed, like a law of nature, for until after 1893 he had known no time when this rule did not hold good. Nor could it be otherwise so long as the mints were open and free to coin for him; consequently, he put all his little savings into silver ornaments, since by this means he could not only please the feminine members of his family with articles of personal adornment but could at the same time provide against the contingency of a short crop. This manner of hoarding silver was so general and has been so long practised in India that it may be called a hereditary habit, and no better provision against want could have been adopted by a people living always so near to the starvation line.

Professor Hopkins blames the usurer for the helplessness of the "peasant farmer;" he says "his grain goes chiefly not to pay the land tax, but to buy a mortgage and keep the usurer quiet. For the expenses of a wedding or a funeral he will cheerfully double this same mortgage. And he pays 180 per cent. to 300 per cent. interest, not on the sum loaned but on this sum with a cipher added, which the usurer knows how to tuck on and the peasant is too ignorant to discover." It happens, nevertheless, that the wisdom of Solomon could not have de-

vised a better method of protection against the wiles of the usurer than that adopted by the cultivator in hoarding silver. Instinctively he had seized upon the one commodity for saving which gave him the upper hand in his trading. Knowing as he did that the ornaments pledged for his borrowings were, weight for weight, the equal in value of the rupees paid to him by the usurer, a computation of the amount of interest due was not beyond his capacity.

It was not until the simple financial methods of the cultivator were demolished by the action of his British ruler that he became a helpless prey to the rapacity of the native usurer. By demonetization his indebtedness to the usurer was increased in the proportion of the fiat value added to the rupee, and his taxes were similarly increased. By demonetization the value of his silver ornaments had been depreciated in the same ratio that his debts and his taxes had been increased; but a still more serious consequence to him was that these silver ornaments no longer served him as effectively as before the mints were closed. Having lost through demonetization the function of money, these ornaments were no more available to the cultivator in effecting his exchanges than would be an equal amount, in value, of any one of the base metals. With open mints the ornaments had been to him equivalent to money in hand. With open mints the uncoined silver, which is so generally diffused among the people of India, became actual money wherever and whenever it was used to effect an exchange.

I am aware that the Indian government considers that only the silver that is coined is money; but this is not the view held by bankers, nor does it accord with their practise. No one will question for a moment that the uncoined gold in the Bank of England, which is held for the redemption of notes in circulation, is as truly money as is the coined gold similarly held. It is the service performed by the silver or by the gold, and not the coining, that constitutes it money. All that coining does is to verify the quantity and quality of metal in the pieces and to fix a unit coin, or common denominator, for convenience in computations.

It is useless to talk of giving India a gold currency, for it cannot be done; a metal so costly cannot circulate in that country, and therefore cannot be brought within the reach of the cultivators, as it must be if it is to subserve their monetary needs. Of all commodities, silver is the one most eminently fitted for this service. Silver was the money of India long before the Englishman had made his appearance there; it had come into general use, not by the wisdom of legislators but by a process of natural selection; and if the Indian government would cease its arbitrary interference with this natural order, silver would again assume its functions as the currency and standard of value for the people of India. The ideas of money entertained by the Indian government are those that were commonly held in England at the beginning of this century; money with it is not simply a commodity that performs a certain public service, but something that can only perform its functions when it has the sanction of the sovereign. These erroneous views were thoroughly exploded as early as 1810 by a committee of Parliament in a report commonly known as "The Bullion Report." That committee conclusively established the principle that money should derive its value and purchasing power from the metal composing it, and that a government's duty is to free this metal from all artificial restrictions, in order that the coin in circulation may truly represent the commercial value of the metal. It took Lombard Street ten years to comprehend and accept these principles; how long will it take the official mind of British India to reach the same conclusion?

In 1893 there was an almost universal apprehension that the silver mines of the United States would flood the world with silver and reduce the price to an indefinitely low figure. In that year the long agitation of the silver question in the United States had culminated in a demand for the repeal of the silver-purchasing clause of the Sherman Act, and in November of that year the measure was adopted. Anticipating this action, the government of India, in great alarm, closed its mints in June of the same year. It would be from the purpose of

this article to enter into any discussion of the causes of the disparity in the relative value of gold and silver; it may, however, be well to state incidentally that, at the very time of these occurrences, the owners of the mines that caused the alarm were agreeing that the low price of silver made it advisable for them to shut down their mines—a course which they then adopted and to which they have since adhered. I understand that the silver now produced in the United States comes altogether from lead and copper mining, silver being a co-product with these metals. It is also a co-product with gold, though to a much more limited extent; so that, practically, silver mining as such has ceased to be an industry in the United States.

The change in the relative value of gold and silver that had taken place between 1873 and 1893 was fairly expressed by the rupee. At the beginning of this period ten rupees were equal to £1 sterling, whereas at its close it required sixteen and a half rupees to buy a gold sovereign. In other words, the value of the rupee had fallen from 2s. to 1s. 2½d.; but this, be it remembered, applied only to its relation to gold, for with reference to other commodities the value of silver had changed but little. When the rupee was employed to pay gold debts, the divergence appeared as stated, but its purchasing power was not diminished when it was used to procure the products of the farm or of any of the industries. As the taxes are payable in silver and as the indebtedness of India to Great Britain is payable in gold, the Indian revenue was necessarily affected unfavorably by this divergence in the value of the two metals. During the twenty years that the rupee had been declining in value, there had been now a deficit and now a surplus, ending in March, 1893, with a net deficit of Rx. 2,398,000. If the decline in the revenue had been relatively the same as the decline in the value of the rupee, in which coin the taxes were paid, the deficit would have exceeded Rx. 40,000,000, but the deficit was not in that proportion, mainly for three reasons: first, because, though the rupee had declined in reference to gold, its purchasing power had diminished but little; secondly, because,

as the indebtedness of one nation to another is paid chiefly in general merchandise and not in the money metal, which is used to settle balances only, the debts of India to Great Britain were paid mainly in merchandise; thirdly, because production had steadily increased.

The metal that is the monetary standard of a people should be at all times in sufficient quantity in the circulation to meet every possible demand; it should be within the easy reach of every one, the laborer as well as the banker. This principle is fundamental and applies to all peoples, whether in the credit stage of industrialism or not, because even in the credit stage there is always a substratum that has not yet reached that stage. This principle of money applies, however, much more emphatically to communities that have not entered the credit stage than to those that have, because in the credit stage there is higher intelligence and a greater ability to neutralize any arbitrary restrictions imposed upon the people through mistakes in legislation. In support of this statement I will use the currency panic in the United States in August, 1893, to illustrate how an arbitrary restriction of the currency was met by a people in the credit stage, in contrast with the effect of a similar restriction (closure) upon the people of India. The panic of August, 1893, was caused by legislative restrictions imposed upon the issue of credit-money. Our government had appropriated to itself the exclusive right to issue paper money; I say "exclusive," for, notwithstanding that the national banks issue notes, these notes are so completely controlled by the government as to be practically government money. The currency had consequently little or no elasticity, and the hoarding of notes by individuals who had become alarmed over the silver agitation brought on the panic. Then it was that our people showed their ability to overcome the stringency in spite of arbitrary rulings. Individuals and corporations all over the land began immediately to issue paper money on their own account, though each issue, and every reissue as well, was subject to a tax of ten per cent. The tax on these issues has never been collected; yet the Act stands, a blot upon the statute-books

and a discredit to every Congress that has sat since its passage, March 3, 1865.

To be effective in promoting industry and productiveness, the currency of a people must, in response to the varying demand for money, have the quality of expanding in volume in seasons of active trade and of contracting when trade is dull. This is an essential qualification, whether the money is exclusively metallic, as in the case of a community that has not entered the credit stage, or is of metal and paper, as in the case of one that has. A community in the latter stage, however, because of its larger and more complex trade, needs a much more elastic currency than the former, and such a currency is only obtainable through the issue of credit-money. Indeed, without credit-money the trade of the world never could have reached its present magnitude, for the mere labor of handling the precious metals would long ago have checked its growth; these metals, besides, would have been quite insufficient in quantity.

The absolute need of elasticity in a currency has long been accepted as an economic principle, and so far as I know it is a principle that has never been questioned; yet this natural law has been utterly ignored by the Indian government. Except at the commercial centers, where paper money is in use, the currency of the people of India is necessarily metallic, and therefore can derive elasticity only from the interchange of the coined silver in circulation or from the innumerable small hoards of uncoined silver that are brought into monetary service when needed. But by the closing of the mints the uncoined silver was deprived of its monetary function and could, therefore, no longer contribute any elasticity to the currency. In addition to this, in order to force up the current value of the rupee so as to increase the taxes and thereby enlarge the revenue, the volume of rupees had to be reduced much below the minimum of the people's needs, the inevitable result being a rigidly inelastic currency. To raise the current value of the rupee above its bullion value it is necessary either to contract the volume of rupees in circulation or to redeem them in gold

at a gold valuation, and such redemption is, I understand, the ultimate aim of the Indian government. But even this course will not serve the needs of the cultivators, for it will not bring the uncoined silver into monetary service. The rupee will then be only a token, not real money. What credit does for more advanced communities the uncoined silver does for the peasant farmers of India; with open mints and coinage for individual account, the uncoined silver would impart the necessary elasticity to the whole volume of Indian currency.

The effect upon India of restricting the supply of metallic money differs only in degree from the effect produced in the United States by restricting the supply of credit-money. In both cases the productive power of the people is reduced; but while in India the result may be a famine, it is only in the case of panic that in the United States the hardship endured goes beyond an enforced economy in personal expenditure. A panic is the struggle among commercial men to maintain their credit, for if that goes down their business and their future prospects go down with it. With the cultivator in India there is no panic, for he has no credit, and his margin of capital above the famine line is so narrow that it may easily be reduced to nothing by a false governmental ruling that he is incompetent to overcome; he simply sinks into helplessness and hopelessness.

The enormous quantity of silver absorbed by Eastern nations in the past has been a marvel to Western financiers, but here is the explanation: These nations in their industrial progress have not yet reached the stage of economizing their money metal by the use of credit. Silver is the only metal that can serve the monetary needs of India, and she must have it in superabundance if she is ever to rise above famine conditions. No more unscientific and destructive ruling could have been adopted than the imposition of a gold monetary standard upon the people of India.

WILLIAM BROUGH.

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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE "TRUST" PROBLEM.

THE tendency toward the concentration of capital employed in modern industry, by way of substituting some form of combination or coöperation for the competition that hitherto prevailed, seems peculiar to no one country. We observe a tendency in that direction in every commercial country in Europe, especially in Great Britain, France, and Germany. It would seem, however, that it is in the United States alone that this phase of commercial evolution has assumed the dimensions of a political problem, and has become associated with evils so pronounced that they must be mended or ended. Americans cannot understand why the British public, as appears from the London correspondence in their daily newspapers, views with indifference the frequent formation of syndicates and "combines" that aim at the control of large volumes of industry. The following remarks bearing upon the experience of Great Britain are intended to supply the answer to this question, and to illustrate some of the most striking differences between British and American industrial combinations of the "trust" character.

In Great Britain the tendency toward big "combines" seems to be but the natural reaction from the destructive competition of a decade ago or more. The cry of ruinous competition was frequently heard, and, although it is not easy to understand how competition could be carried to the point of ruin, yet there can be no doubt that wages and profits sank very low. Much of this ruinous competition came from America; more of it came from Germany—both countries that, while erecting high tariffs to exclude English goods, were not at all slow to take advantage of England's "open door" for the disposal of their products. This was one reason why rival manufacturers thought of combining their interests; another reason was the frequent and severe conflicts that used to take place between capital and labor. To meet so stern and complex a struggle

for existence, the manufacturers in many of the trades were forced to take counsel together and reconsider their position. If they could not stop competition, they could at least, by substituting a few large competitors for many small ones, eliminate some of the waste and increase efficiency of production, thus leaving a larger margin for profit after complying fully with the competitive conditions. A good many masters' combinations were formed in this manner. The textile trade was one of the first to put its house in order, and several amalgamations on the "trust" principle were successfully floated and still continue to exist.

Among these may be mentioned the well-known firm of J. P. Coats & Co., of Paisley, Scotland, a combination of several leading sewing-cotton manufacturers that was formed in 1890, with a capital of over \$25,000,000. The English Sewing Cotton Company was formed in 1897, and is an amalgamation of fifteen different firms, with a capital of \$13,750,000. The Calico Printers' Association was formed the same year, and comprises sixty large firms with a capital of \$46,000,000. The Bradford Dyers' Association was formed in December, 1898; it embraces twenty-two large firms, with a capital of \$22,500,000, and is estimated to control about 90 per cent. of the trade. The Fine Cotton Spinners and Doublers' Union was formed the same year, and covers thirty-one firms, with a capital of \$30,000,000. The Wall Papers', United Velvet Cutters', and British Cotton and Wool Dyers' Associations were all formed during the present year, on the same model as the others and equipped on the same scale. The professed object of all the above consolidations has been to improve trade without doing any injury to the consumer, and just in proportion as this principle has been kept in mind have the undertakings proved successful. The English Sewing Cotton Company has paid good dividends to its shareholders from the beginning. The Fine Cotton Spinners and Doublers' Association has, as a result of its last year's working, paid a dividend of eight per cent.—a tolerably good return. Such results are in marked contrast to the fate of the Salt Union, whose shareholders have never

got any return. Here was a bold attempt to capture a whole industry in one of the necessities of life, and to dictate prices to the consumers in a free-trade country. Its shareholders tried to grab *all* the nuts, and so they got none.

Another form of combination was contrived which included not only the masters but the workmen, and is known as the Birmingham Smithsonian Trades' Combination scheme, from the name of its promoter, Mr. E. J. Smith, and the fact that it originated in Birmingham and was successfully applied to many branches of the hardware industry in that town. This kind of combination aims at securing harmony between employers and employed, and, while not raising prices to the consumer to any great extent, yet manages to maintain them at a sufficiently high standard adequately to remunerate the capital and labor engaged in the trade. Although the scheme is an elaborate one, providing penalties for manufacturers who undersell their fellows and in other irritating ways restricting their independence, yet it can hardly be said to be anything more than a qualified success. In the bedstead industry, which it chiefly dominates, the profits do not exceed on an average seven per cent., and, although the prices to the public are supposed to be fixed by the association, yet it is freely asserted that secret rebates on these prices are frequently allowed to customers, one or two prominent manufacturers having recently withdrawn from the association because they could not secure orders at the fixed prices owing to the secret competition of the "rebate." Nor has the expected harmony between masters and workmen been altogether realized. Coercion is said to be the cornerstone of the system; freedom can only be kept from oozing out by the closest vigilance, and there is constant friction between the naturally opposing interests. It may be mentioned that this was the sort of combination advocated by the late Sir George Elliot, a leading colliery owner, in 1893, for the control of the coal-mining industry. Nothing, however, came of the project at the time.

The class of large concerns known as "department stores" has within recent years become very popular in Great Britain,

and has been subjected to some adverse criticism as tending to drive out of the market the legitimate traders in its respective branches. But, although this charge is to some extent true, it cannot be said to be the result of monopoly. Better organization and low prices are the secret of the success of the department stores, and the public at large does not complain of their expansion. "Small profits and quick returns" is the motto of these organizations, and the expedient of providing customers under the same roof with every article they require, from fish-hooks to Seidlitz powders, seems to insure a turnover large enough to undersell the single-trade man. It is only a case of survival of the fittest.

In the liquor trade it is a fact that the bulk of the trade is falling into the hands of the big brewers. The process is a simple one. Certain brewing firms acquire a reputation for the excellence of their products and thereby become wealthy. Then, as public-houses come into the market, these brewers are able to outbid the small publicans, with the result that the latter sink into the position of managers on salary, under the licensing transfer system, and the trade is thus coming to be monopolized and worked on a more uniform plan. The prices to the consumer are not raised, though restrictions are placed upon the quality of the liquor supplied. Beyond an occasional sentimental tear at the wiping out of the independent publican, little dissatisfaction is felt by the outside public at this phase of the drink traffic, though the whole question is likely soon to be the object of radical legislation.

Besides the systems of formal combination above referred to, there exist in most trades local and national associations of manufacturers and dealers, whose object is to arrive at a common understanding as regards prices and to discourage ruinous competition. A "black-list" is kept of traders found selling under the fixed price, and pressure is brought to bear upon the wholesale houses with a view to their not supplying those retailers who are guilty of such practises. The law of libel and the law of conspiracy are, however, wholesome checks to any abuse of this system, and its influence has not much effect upon the general balance of prices.

There are certain departments of human industry that, from their very nature, must in all countries tend to develop monopolistic features. To this class belong the telegraphs, telephones, railways, and shipping. The telegraphs have long since been taken over by the British government and are operated by the Post-office Department with the most satisfactory results. The telephones still remain the property of one private company, which pays to the government a royalty of ten per cent. on its gross receipts. Its charges to the public vary from \$40 to \$100 a year, the rates for the metropolis being fixed higher than elsewhere. Lately, owing to sharp Parliamentary criticism, and the threat of municipal competition held out by the government, the National Telephone Company has reduced its charges in the provinces to \$16 per annum, or, with the government royalty added, \$17.50. The company's license expires in 1911, at which time the whole telephone system will revert to the government. Last year the company paid a dividend of six per cent. upon its ordinary shares.

As regards the British railway monopoly, the important powers exercised by the Board of Trade over the railways prevent any such discrimination in rates as is said to have contributed so largely to the ascendancy that the trusts have gained in the United States. Every railway company is bound, under the Traffic Act of 1888, to submit a list of its rates on all classes of merchandise to the Board, which may, if it think fit, draw up a list of its own and present it to Parliament for adoption in a bill. The competition between the various railways for traffic is, in the main, real and effective; but when the competition becomes extreme it generally results in combination, as in the well-remembered case of the South Eastern and London, Chatham & Dover railways, which, two years ago, decided to bury the hatchet and to work for their mutual benefit—somewhat to the alarm of a too confiding public.

In the shipping trade, while there can hardly be said to be any such thing as a trust, there is generally a friendly arrange-

ment between established lines covering the same routes of traffic not unduly to compete with one another. New competitors occasionally make their appearance, but they are soon bought off, or "squared" in some other way, so as not to interfere with the recognized scale of freight charges. In addition to this the charge is freely made that certain well-known British steamship lines, which enjoy a subsidy from their own government, are in the habit of discriminating in favor of the foreigner and giving him an undue advantage, not only in the foreign but in the home markets. To this extent their methods are quite in keeping with those of the American trusts, which sell high to Americans, and sell low to the foreigner what they cannot dispose of at home.

Many other examples might be given of the extent to which contrivances, framed with the object of restricting the natural flow of competition, have been adopted by British manufacturers and traders; but those already cited are sufficient to show the kind of shape that the movement has assumed in Great Britain. When the protectionist newspapers assert that free-trade England has its trusts as well as tariff-bound America, they are stating what is the truth, but they are not stating the whole truth. The good or evil of a trust depends greatly on its environment. The structure of the institution *per se* is not calculated to convey its real meaning and effect. Broadly speaking, the chief differences between British and American trusts would seem to be that the former are avowedly aggressive in their character while the latter owe their origin mainly to self-defense. Or, if such were not their respective origins, such at least from their different environments must be their respective policies. No British trade monopoly can afford to raise the price of any commodity above the level at which the same commodity can be imported from abroad. When that point is reached, foreign competition comes to the rescue and the normal balance is restored. Of course, if a world-wide monopoly could be secured, as has already been done in oil and was attempted in copper, the principle would not hold good; and the fact that industrial capitalism is becom-

ing every day more international in scope is one that may have to be reckoned with at some future time.* But so long as foreign competition is possible must the would-be home monopolist be held in check. England's commercial system is regulated from the point of view of the consumer. At present he is preparing to import coal from America, prices having reached the foreign-competition level.

The formation of trusts has, therefore, no terrors for the British consumer. To be sure, he regards it as an interesting phase of coöperative development, and accordingly takes note of its results; but he does not appeal to his Parliament to stop it. He makes no complaint, for the simple reason that the shoe does not pinch. A general election is likely to take place very shortly, and it may be confidently predicted that the trust question will not find a place in the election address of any of the candidates.

There is, however, another person besides the consumer whose interests ought not to be forgotten, *viz.*, the small manufacturer or trader who has been displaced. How fares it with him? He bows to his fate with philosophic calm, and either becomes a comfortable subordinate in the business in which he formerly held a twopenny-halfpenny independence, or, if he is not too old to do so, contrives to adapt himself to the requirements of some other department of the great national industrial machine.

So long, therefore, as large aggregations of capital confine themselves to the task of cheapening production, and draw their increased profits out of the economies they thus make instead of out of the consumers' necessities, so long should they be welcomed in the same way that every other labor-saving contrivance is welcomed. But when they take their stand upon some exclusive privilege or opportunity for production that is conferred upon them, and when their avowed object is to

* Many British manufacturing firms have branches abroad. Thus the firm of J. P. Coats & Co. has mills in the United States; Armstrong, Mitchell & Co. have works in Italy; and the United Alkali Company has recently begun operations in Michigan, under the name of the North American Chemical Co.—to profit by the American tariff.

establish an industrial dictatorship so as to make beggars of the community, the latter may well regard them in a different light. The measure of the exclusive privilege conferred will of course be the measure of its potency for evil. Where the field of trade is level, the waters of competition will flow evenly, and the natural margin of "live and let live" will be automatically determined. Dams cannot be formed without the aid of barriers, and the trust system will not have been an unmixed evil if it should open the eyes of the American people to the advisability of inaugurating that freedom of trade which is the strongest safeguard against that alarming monstrosity—commercial despotism.

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GROWTH OF NATIONAL FEELING IN GERMANY.

TO one who lived in Germany prior to the Franco-Prussian war, and who has returned to that country within the last few years, the change in public sentiment on the subject of national feeling is amazing. Before the war Germany knew nothing of a central government; there was no central authority, no national colors, and patriotism with the manifold emotions allied to it was evoked by the name of the ruler of each particular country. Bavarians waved aloft their flag of blue and white, and fought and died with the name of their beloved king upon their lips; and Württembergers, Saxons, and Suabians did likewise. Sectional jealousy was inconceivably bitter, and the feeling that separated North from South Germany was almost as strong as that cherished toward rival lands.

Even to-day, under one ruler, one flag, and one set of laws, it is difficult to convince any section that its virtues may be duplicated in other parts of the empire; and the confusion of local flags of every shade and combination, which mingle with the imperial colors, detracts much from the harmony of gala occasions.

The northern provinces, with their strictly Protestant population, are still very different from the southern, where Catholicism rules and the old rivalry has by no means died out.

Love for his own ruler and pride in his own birthplace have held sway for too many hundred years to be smothered by a political *coup d'état*, however brilliant; and allegiance to native sovereign and fealty to his house have too long been the highest expression of national patriotism to be quickly merged in the more impersonal love for a distant and unknown Emperor. The wisest political leaders look the matter squarely in the face and adjust political policy accordingly.

From time immemorial, Germany has been merely a loose union of States, each striving for supremacy and bound to-

gether for political purposes only, and, till the great war fused these antagonistic and hostile factors into one concrete mass, there was little hope of betterment. But the ideal Germany has always been a united one, and her poets have ever sung of the strength and grandeur of a united Fatherland. Bismarck and the old Emperor were not the first to dream of such a consummation; Frederick the Great had visions too, and, though his highest ambition was limited to a desire to place his beloved Prussia in the front rank, he foresaw that the only way to do so was to develop its resources, to (exclude all foreign material, and to depend as much as possible upon home industries.) These industrial truths have become so trite that it is hard to believe that they were considered quite revolutionary, but Frederick met with some opposition in carrying them out. When he declared that his contemplated palace of San Souci should be built of German stone and German metals, he was thought fanatical, but the impetus that he gave to home industries has proved it to be almost the wisest step he ever took.

Somewhat later, in the war of Liberation, and after the people had shaken off Napoleon's yoke, the horrors of a common past drew them much nearer together, and the hope of a united country aided in cementing the bonds; but the times were not ripe and the spirit of the people not ready for so radical a change in hereditary prejudices and time-honored beliefs.

(The development of a national literature paved the way for the more complicated and difficult political unity, and it was in itself a most powerful and necessary factor.) An eternal debt of gratitude is due to those far-seeing pioneers who first wrote and preached against the universal subjection to French standards of taste and French literary forms. Lessing, Herder, Klopstock, and Bürger were the men most largely instrumental in founding modern German literature, and since their day the literary unity of the people has been maintained.

The next step was to purge the language of foreign words, but these had become so deeply embedded that the reformers accomplished merely the initiative in a movement toward purity of speech that has had to wait till the present day for further

development. The Germans have been much behind the English in realizing the value of using their native tongue undefiled by foreign elements; and what Jeremy Taylor and Milton and the host of other English writers attempted was not begun till several generations after the English reform. The best writers in England and America have so long been devoted to short Anglo-Saxon words, and have so rigorously excluded foreign ones, that one is surprised to find the same tendency so much more recent in Germany. Though the purists suspected that the language needed some such pruning in the time of Bürger and Klopstock, and though many changes in more rational spelling were suggested by them, till lately no national effort has been made to exclude foreign words. Here, as in many other reforms, the present Kaiser is the moving spirit; and we find that he has even called in legislation to aid him in making it obligatory to use the German language exclusively in all written reports of the army.

The reform is notably striking in the railway and postal service, for till recently most of the terms used in these departments had been taken from the French, though there were plenty of good German equivalents. It is now considered bad form to use a French word when a German can be found, and the language has gained immeasurably by it—but not more than the national pride has swelled in being able to get along so well without the aid of the detested French. Societies have also been formed for the improvement of the mother tongue, and teachers and officials take much pains to forward the movement.

(The union of the twenty-five German States under an imperial form of government, which was effected through the agency of the Franco-Prussian war,) seems at first glance to be the crowning point in a long series of efforts; but Germany is far from being "united," as the word is understood in England and America, and it may be generations before the real unity is accomplished. The first tentative political step was taken as long ago as 1848, when Bismarck calmly ignored the claims of Austria to a protectorate over Germany and startled

the crowned heads who were assembled in Frankfurt to consider mutual interests by rating himself, the representative of Prussia, on an equality with Austria. The petty distinctions that prevailed must have seemed amusing to his sturdy common sense, and Americans will appreciate Bismarck's attitude in overturning them. It was an unwritten law, for example, that only the Ambassador of Austria should have the right to smoke in the Assembly, and when Bismarck coolly lighted his long cigar, and puffed unconcernedly in the indignant face of the solitary Austrian smoker, consternation and surprise sat upon every countenance. It was really the first attempt to break through the hedge of petty privileges with which Austria had hitherto surrounded herself, and, though so small and laughable an incident in itself, it led up to the final break between the rivals.

Other restrictions demanded by the etiquette of the occasion were equally galling; and when we read that only such-and-such crowned heads had the privilege of sitting in arm-chairs, while lesser rulers, as dukes and princes, had to be content with chairs without arms, we wonder that they stood it as long as they did.

But something stronger than diplomacy was needed to bring the different States to a realizing sense of the conflicting interests that divided them and stood in the way of their progress, and to show that power could alone be gained through concerted effort. (This the brilliant victories of 1870 demonstrated, and the proud nation began at once to investigate its past history and study the lesson of former unions of the people. But, strange to say, no complete union had been effected till the sixth century after Christ, when Hermann united the different tribes and thereby succeeded in triumphing over the Romans.) The old Kaiser was at once compared with the immortal Hermann, and the enthusiasm engendered by his valiant performances and the love that his really beautiful character inspired continued to hold together the twenty-five States of the empire.

This sentimental phase of the union is by no means so strong

since his death; for the present Emperor is not very popular in South Germany, and the feelings entertained by Bavarians toward the empire have cooled in proportion as the power and influence of Prussia have encroached upon Bavarian territory and Bavarian privileges, real or fancied.

Other factors in the growth of national harmony are, however, constantly gaining strength. (The unifying influence effected by the clubs and other societies of women is of tangible value, and for the first time in German history women have aided in an important political issue.) Until within very recent date German women may be said to have had no public influence, and the point may not now be granted; yet the contrast between past and present circumstances cannot fail to be encouraging to the unbiased observer. The union of German women in 1894, under the broad and catholic leadership of Augusta Schmidt of Leipsic, has been of inestimable value in welding together all women in Germany and in destroying the petty local prejudices and antagonisms that had been peculiarly noticeable among them.

The first women who became the speakers for their sex have also done much to unite the different provinces, since their work has taken them into all parts of the empire and their breadth of view and cosmopolitan manners have acted most favorably upon provincial minds. And where the women of a country are united in sympathy and common aims, we may look for real permanence of sentiment. This was the experience of America in the reconstructive period following the civil war, and nothing has been found to cement the North and the South so solidly as the growth of common interests among the women. It is an influence that, however, the Emperor would gladly dispense with; for he is known to be strongly opposed to the enlargement of woman's sphere, and is quoted as saying that the women of the empire should limit their activity, as does *his* wife, to church, kitchen, and children. The Dowager Empress, on the other hand, is alive to every issue touching the welfare and progress of her sex, and her name is associated with nearly all movements managed by women.

(The last important factor in uniting Germany is one whose influence is brought to bear upon every child in the empire, for it is an integral part of the public-school system and impregnates the three vital studies of geography, history, and reading. The studies have been made the means of inculcating love of country, patriotism in its best sense, and unity of national feeling, and the results are even more encouraging than the pedagogical reformers dared to hope. Take, for example, the study of history. Instead of devoting all the time as formerly to studying the myths of the Greeks and Romans, the legends and sagas of the early Germans are investigated and the character of their noblest men held up as an example to the children. Thus the ancient heroes become national in an entirely new sense, and another common sympathy is added to the growing basis of national patriotism. The history of each locality is also taken in reference to its influence upon the whole empire, and national issues are shown to be intimately connected with local events. Reading lessons are also made to assist in developing breadth of national feeling, and the selections are all that could be desired.

That there is also genuine effort to unite on religious questions is true; but the difficulty of bridging the chasm between the two great divisions of Christians, Catholic and Protestant, is so great that advance is necessarily slow. The conviction of German educators that religious or rather doctrinal training should be given in the common schools retards this tendency to work harmoniously side by side; and so long as separate schools are maintained for Jews, Catholics, and Protestants, little headway can be made.

All these factors taken together present a very reassuring sight; for they seem sufficiently strong to make possible a real and permanent union of the people—when the term "German nationality" will call up the image of one great ruler, one flag, and one unified central government. That day is far distant, but the signs are favorable and the number of true national patriots constantly growing. Boundary-lines are becoming less and less important—national issues more and more vital;

and the outcome is bound to be propitious to all lovers of a united Germany. Some enthusiasts and dreamers look forward to the day when the twenty-five States will no longer have separate rulers, and they hope for something like our State Governors to take the place of hereditary kings and dukes; but each and every reigning house is so deeply embedded in the history of its State, and the people are still so devoted to the family that represents to them the flower of their own particular civilization, that nothing short of a revolution in their mental attitude could bring about this result.

Nor is this so desirable, if the proper balance be observed between central authority and provincial government. The Germans are apparently, as a nation, devoted to rank and nobility, and not in the least desirous of equalizing the different classes of society; so this reform would not voice the desire of the people. But they *are* deeply concerned in becoming a world power; and one of the most important elements of success in that direction lies in building up a strong and permanent feeling of national unity. With an Emperor whose vigilance is unceasing and whose mind embraces every interest of his people, from the largest to the smallest detail, the consummation of these hopes may lie in the near future. And it is safe to predict that the demolition of every obstacle in the path of national unity and the utilization of every favoring factor may wisely be left to the Emperor's vigorous hand.

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THE STUDY AND NEEDS OF SOCIOLOGY.

THE need of a science of social relations becomes painfully manifest the moment we realize that there is nothing to-day that meets this requirement. Almost all the social questions that vex the people and threaten the existence of social order would quickly disappear if there were formulated a body of scientific principles based on known facts and in harmony with the nature, aspirations, and tendencies of the people who constitute all society. I will try to make this clear.

Science is defined by Webster as "knowledge duly arranged, and referred to general truths and principles on which it is founded, and from which it is derived; a branch of learning considered as having certain completeness, philosophical knowledge, profound knowledge, complete knowledge, true knowledge." This is what I mean by science; and this is what I plead for when I present the needs of the time for a science of sociology. It must be a science that stands or falls, at all times, upon the truth or falsity of its proclaimed facts and principles. A truth needs not the sanction of authority, the protection of law, or the safeguard of orthodoxy. These things are but an offense, a stench in the nostrils of truth. Whenever any proposition needs these supports, it is time to bring it to the bar of truth and call upon it to defend itself against the charge of error. It is only error—only falsehood that needs any sort of artificial crutch to lean upon outside of itself.

Now, taking sociology to mean "that branch of philosophy which treats of human society," it is evident that as yet there is no such thing as a science of sociology. There is nothing within the realm of human knowledge bearing upon social relations that in any way answers the requirements as to philosophic truth and completeness which are called for by our definition of science. It is true that there exists a body of teaching,

which is given in some of the colleges and universities, under the name of sociology; but it lacks every element of science, as is readily seen even on slight examination. Nor is it possible that this should be different under the circumstances. The revenues of present institutions of learning, with rare exceptions, depend upon endowments made up of gifts, actual or prospective, from wealthy men who furnish the principal resources of these institutions. The governing bodies, the trustees, hold their places as the agents of their rich patrons, or else as suppliants begging for endowments with which to carry on their work. This necessarily makes them subservient to wealth as such, and prevents all teaching in those institutions that would offend those actual or prospective donors by attacking their private accumulations or the privileges by which they were obtained. It is obvious, then, that no matter how conscientious and faithful may be the instructors in those endowed institutions, or institutions seeking endowments, no body of teaching bearing upon social adjustments can ever prevail that tends to lessen the power of the rich over the poor or to prevent the accumulation of their riches. And it is just as impossible that a science of human society, the application of which, in practise, would equally preserve and protect all the members of that society, by providing for the needs of all without favor, should ever originate in such an environment.

To show that this is no fanciful statement of a remote and improbable contingency, I have only to point to the long list of professors who have been dismissed from their places within the last ten years, for teaching social doctrines at variance with the supposed interests of men of wealth, or who have espoused the cause of the poor against their rich oppressors. These cases have been too many and too conspicuous to require more than a general mention. In few of them has there been more than a pretense that the action taken was for other reasons than to gain the favor of those who make endowments to institutions of learning. When we come to the fundamental principles on which a science of sociology must be built, if we are ever to have such a science, it will be seen how vital it is

to the wealthy and privileged classes not only that no such science should be taught but that there should be no such science to be taught.

That which is taught in the schools as social science is a jumble of partial facts and unsupported theories under the heads of "science of government," "political economy," "finance," and "social problems." The social problems include a few harmless things about wages, trades-unions, monopolies, pauperism, and criminality, all tending to foster the idea of some essential superiority and virtue on the part of the rich and justifying their rulership over the poor. They are harmless in that they do not endanger the privileges of the rich, but vicious and hurtful to the extent that they promote false notions of human relationships and hinder the development of better social adjustments. The science of government, so far as it is a science at all, is the science of rulership—of the mastery of a part of the people over others; the science of spoliation—of greed and of exploitation. It is based upon the principle of getting the utmost away from everybody else and giving the least possible in return. It is the philosophy of "dog eat dog." Historically and philosophically, it is the direct antithesis of freedom and equality, upon which all scientific society must rest.

Their political economy and finance are no better. They make no pretense to economic justice. The schools are only propagating-grounds for spreading economic heresies that violate every principle of righteousness in the interest of the rich. Here are laid the foundations of schemes for taxing away the substance of the poor so subtly and silently that the poor shall never suspect that they are being robbed. And here are taught doctrines of finance that perpetuate the slavery of debt upon the whole world. So that there is no such thing as a science of sociology; and if such a science is ever to be constructed it must be done outside of the recognized institutions of learning.

It may be objected that all this takes no account of the great number of institutions for higher education under the

control of the State and municipal authorities, and which are supported by taxation; but wealth governs here just as absolutely, only in a different way, as it does in those privately endowed. The contributions of the rich to the campaign funds of the political parties give to them the same influence over political administrations that they enjoy in the administration of endowed colleges. The one concern, greater than all others, of every political party or administration is to continue itself in power or to displace its opponent. To do this it must have money and lots of it. And those who furnish the money are the rich and privileged, who dictate the terms on which they make their contributions. No party can, except under rare circumstances, win an election and attain to power without the favor of these large contributors; and after it has obtained the power its only hope of keeping it is to maintain its standing with those contributors. Therefore, wealth exerts the same influence in the one class of institutions that it does in the other. In one case it operates through the college trustee, while in the other it is through the political boss; but in each the control is equally effective. It is idle to hope for relief from institutions controlled by either of these agencies.

This is not to blame either the authorities or instructors in these institutions. We can condemn the system without passing judgment on the men. If we tolerate the system we cannot justly find fault with those who take advantage of it. This condition of affairs must continue so long as the colleges and universities depend upon present methods of raising their revenues. The system of endowments and State support has outlived its usefulness. It has become an abuse. It no longer promotes human progress by increasing the facilities for education; but it hampers progress by limiting the opportunities for obtaining an education. It is only a small percentage at best, and that percentage is fast decreasing, of the people who can go to college and get what is termed a liberal education. With an adequate science of sociology, something that would be recognized as bearing the manifest stamp of truth, this would be changed. Society would quickly shape itself to meet

the requirements. The privileges of the rich only continue by reason of the ignorance of the people. Once the nature and effect of those privileges became generally known they would be brought to a speedy termination. The people would no longer give up their earnings to support an idle and useless class. Instead of an almost universal poverty there would come a universal prosperity in which all could indulge their utmost ambitions in the line of study. There was a time when endowments promoted the spread of knowledge—when they were necessary to the growth and development of education; but that time has passed. When the production of wealth was slow and difficult and was mainly carried on by manual labor, it was only a few who could afford the time and expense required to obtain an education. The work of enlarging the field of human knowledge through original research had to be left to the rich. A leisure class was necessary. But now, when the machine has taken the place of human muscles, when steam and electricity furnish the motive power, and when labor has been subdivided until a few months at most, and often a few days, suffice for the acquirement of the skill needed for most of the mechanical occupations, there is no longer need of a leisure class as distinguished from a working class. Privilege has no longer a reason to be.

I shall be asked how it is possible to provide for the support of public institutions of learning except it be by taxation. It is not possible *now*. Things must go on much as they are until a better understanding is reached. A change can only come as a result of a distribution of wealth in which all shall share after a more scientific system has been found and applied. This may consist only in the destruction of class privileges whereby a few now exercise so preponderating an influence in public affairs. It is impossible to tell beforehand just what changes will come as a result of certain other changes. The political machine that we call the State may be abolished entirely; or it may slough off its present characteristics of force and violence and preserve only its administrative features. Or, again, a new business organization may develop from and

through the coöperative needs of the people that will supply all the requirements of a public administration without restriction of the freedom of individuals. This is already done in a measure by the existing stock companies, which administer the affairs of the members without interfering with the personal liberty of those members. But one thing is certain—that, whatever form the new organization shall take on, the needs of the people will determine what that form shall be. At present I think the wise thing is to encourage private institutions of learning that depend upon fees of tuition for their revenues; and then bend every exertion to destroy privilege and increase the resources of the people, and therefore their ability to meet expenditures. Their resources will increase just in proportion as the power of privilege to expropriate their substance is decreased. The development of a science of sociology is the one thing needed to make plain the methods by which this can be accomplished.

On entering upon the study of sociology, from any possible starting-point, one is immediately struck with the multitude of theories that prevail in every branch into which the subject divides itself. Writers almost innumerable have formulated peculiar notions on special subjects, according to their own varied interests or inclinations, with slight regard to their bearing upon others. With rare exceptions these notions are the outgrowth of class prejudices accented by a dense ignorance of the facts and conditions in other classes than their own, which easily magnify the importance of minor facts and principles while missing entirely the greater and more general truths. In this way there has come to be a seeming wilderness of theories and speculations without order or harmony, oftentimes the most contradictory. Thus all manner of cure-alls are offered to the public, each warranted to correct every social ill and usher in a social millennium if only the plans formulated by its particular author are adopted and applied. As a result, we have the people divided into warring factions under different names, each struggling for the mastery, and conducting their warfare in a spirit of partizanship

and intolerance well calculated to hide the truth rather than reveal it. And, still worse, we have the professed followers of the great Teacher—who, more than all others, laid down the fundamental principles on which all social science must rest—trying to cure our social ills by an individual salvation: putting an individual plaster on a social sore.

There is nothing discouraging in this condition of things. On the contrary, it is a hopeful sign. This is the condition that must precede the formulation of a science of sociology. In this way all the facts and theories must be developed and brought to the attention of the real workers in the scientific field, who must find, by large generalizations, the underlying principles of human association. In the same way the sciences of zoology and botany were made possible. A vast amount of knowledge was collected about the physical structure, characteristics, and habitat of plants, and also of the structure, habits, and life history of the lower animals, before these sciences were possible. The same thing has been true of every other branch of science. It has been necessary that all these special theories on the subject of human relationships should be promulgated in order to compel the coming sociologist to take due account of all the factors in the problem before him.

One of the greatest obstacles in the way of the formulation of a science of sociology has been the problem of harmonizing two well-marked tendencies in human development that are seemingly antagonistic. One is, the aspiration everywhere of mankind toward liberty. In every country and in every age this has been the watchword of all popular uprisings and the stimulus to exalted endeavor. And yet, along with the struggles for the realization of this ideal, has gone another tendency to the enslavement of the individual. This has been a marked characteristic, increasingly so, particularly in industry, during the last hundred years, if not always. There has been a steady increase in the subdivision of labor and the application of machinery whereby each individual produces less and less of the things needed for the satisfaction of his own wants, until no man any longer produces more than an infinitesimal part of

anything. Each is becoming more and more dependent upon all the others in the social organism for even the commonest necessities of life. Along with this tendency has gone the rapid absorption, by a few individuals, of both the natural resources and the instruments of production, without which industry is impossible; so that the mass of the people are being enslaved, through their needs, to a small part of their fellows. Manifestly there can be no *science* of sociology that does not take these facts into account and does not harmonize them. This is one of the problems that must be mastered before such a science is possible; but it is only one. In the meantime, the facts of social relations must be studied, and taught in such schools as are free to teach them; and the various theories must be brought to the test of criticism until the time shall come when the knowledge shall be systematically arranged.

When a sufficient knowledge of the details has been obtained, some one with a vision broad enough to take in the whole field, and with keen enough insight to distinguish between essentials and non-essentials, will construct a science of sociology—or, at least, furnish a clew that will enable some one else to do it. Other investigators will correct the mistakes of the first, until the science comes to possess all the completeness and unity of botany or zoology. It will then meet the requirements of Webster's definition already quoted. But it can never spring from the present endowed or State-supported schools and colleges; nor is it likely to be taught in them. When the time arrives that we have such a science, these schools and colleges will have disappeared. Nature has a way of killing any institution when it ceases to minister to human needs; and the killing process, in this case, has already begun, notwithstanding all their wealth and resources. They are getting more and more out of touch and sympathy with the people, which is both the first and final step to their decay. Their wealth cannot save them. The future society must provide for the preservation and sustenance of all the people; and a teaching that fails to give voice to that aspiration will be rejected. A society that fails to do this has no reason to be. And a sociology that

formulates the structure of that society must spring from and be taught by agencies independent of endowments, or revenues derived from political sources, as we know politics now. The aspirations of the people toward liberty are certain to be realized.

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